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The Strategic Defense Initiative and the
Militarization of Space: Scientific
Responsibility and Citizen Resistance
Matthew Lippman*
I. Introduction
The moderating of international tensions between the superpow-
ers, the slowing of the nuclear arms race and the promise of a peace
dividend have all contributed to a lessened popular concern over is-
sues of national defense.1 The diversion of attention from war and
peace has resulted in little scholarly attention being paid to the omi-
nous potential growth in third-generation high-technology weapons. 2
These automated weapons systems are being designed primarily
to operate in outer space where, despite claims to the contrary, they
will be used to enhance the United States'ability to launch a first
strike nuclear attack.3 The technological and strategic foundation of
this revolution in weaponry is the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
SDI is central to neutralizing any retaliatory response to an Ameri-
can nuclear first strike; and the technology spawned by the SDI pro-
gram is being adapted to offensive space weapons.4
Scientists have an obligation to avoid the type of tragic involve-
ment they had in the development of the atomic and hydrogen
bombs and to refuse to participate in the SDI program. Those who
* Associate Professor, University of Illinois at Chicago; LL.M., Harvard Law School;
J.D., American University School of Law; Ph.D., Northwestern University.
This article is dedicated with abiding devotion to the memory of Lidia Janus. May she
continue to inspire us to live with humanity and love.
This article develops many of the themes discussed in The Right of Civil Resistance
Under International Law and the Domestic Necessity Defense, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 349 (1990).
1. See Pentagon Plans Strategic-Weapon Spending Cuts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1990, at
Al, col. I.
2. The atomic and hydrogen bombs comprise the first two generations. Weapons relying
on contemporary, high-technology are third-generation weapons. See generally Klare, The
Conventional Weapons Fallacy, 26 THE NATION, 417-53 (1983) (special issue on The New
Arms Technology And What It Means).
3. See generally R. ALDRIDGE. FIRST STRIKE! THE PENTAGON'S STRATEGY FOR NU-
CLEAR WAR (1983). See also S. RITCHIE, SPACE WAR (1982).
4. See Deudney, Unlocking Space, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1983-84, at 91. For 1990
Congress allocated $3.9 billon to SDI research. In 1991, the appropriation was cut to $2.9
billion. Barnes, Brilliant Pebbles, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1991, at 10. The success of the
Patriot missile during the Gulf War is thought to have made deployment of SDI a virtual
certainty. Id. at II.
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research, design, develop and test these third generation military
weapons may incur international criminal liability. These scientists
have an internationally recognized moral responsiblity to devote
their talents to peaceful concerns.5 Citizens must act to halt this new
threat to the common heritage of outer space and are privileged to
undertake a citizen's arrest of scientists involved in the SDI
program.
II. The International Legal Regulation of Weapons Systems Based
Upon New Technologies: The 1922 Washington Conference Debate
on the Prohibition of Submarines
The challenge of controlling weapon systems which utilize new
and innovative technology has confronted global society on numerous
occasions. One conspicuous example was the unsuccessful British ef-
fort in 1922 to persuade the governmental representatives to the
Washington Conference On The Limitation Of Armament to pro-
hibit the military deployment of submarines. 6
The Conference debated and passed an American-sponsored
resolution which provided that the international law of naval warfare
pertaining to the search, seizure and destruction of merchant vessels
applied to submarines as well as to surface ships.7 The resolution
also provided that those who violated these rules would be subject to
criminal punishment. 8
This multilateral declaration was a direct refutation of the Ger-
man claim during World War I that submarines were not bound by
the customary rules of naval intercourse. The Germans contended
that, if forced to surface, their submarines would be vulnerable to
attack and the small size of the submarines prevented the evacuation
of the crew of the merchant vessel. 9 Therefore, submarines were en-
titled to sink merchant ships without first surfacing, seizing and
searching the ship for prohibited munitions and supplies and evacu-
ating the crew.10
5. An interesting example of scientific responsiblity is the decision of two chemical
firms to refuse to sell to the United States government an ingredient necessary for continued
production of poison gas artillery shells. See Suppliers Reject Poison Gas Program: U.S. May
Act, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1990, at A5, col. I.
6. CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, Washington D.C., 478 (November
12, 1921-February 6, 1922) (remarks of Lord Lee, Great Britian) [hereinafter LIMITATION OF
ARMAMENT].
7. Id. at 266.
8. Id. See generally Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in
Warfare, Feb. 6, 1922, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION: A COLLECTION OF THE
TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST 794 (M.O.
Hudson ed. 1922-24) [Did not enter into force].
9. LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, supra note 6, at 644 (remarks of Mr. Balfour, Great
Britain).
10. Id.
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During the debate on the American resolution, Great Britain
proposed that the maintenance, construction and deployment of sub-
marines should be prohibited rather than merely regulated under the
law of naval warfare.11 The British proposal was premised on the
view that the submarine was not, as claimed, primarily a defensive
weapon to protect territorial waters, but was solely suited to offen-
sive ocean warfare against poorly armed merchant vessels.'" Such
attacks, according to the British, inevitably led to "acts which are
inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity."' 3
The British also noted that while submarines were relatively inex-
pensive to construct, anti-submarine warfare required a country to
build a vast number of costly surface ships-escalating the military
budgets of coastal and island nations."
Lord Lee argued that the submarine was a "weapon of murder
and piracy, involving the drowning of noncombatants. It had been
used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships and even hospital ships."' 5
Technically, the submarine was constructed so that "it could not be
utilized to rescue even women and children from sinking ships."' 6 He
pointed out that during World War I, roughly twelve million tons of
shipping, possessing a value of 1.1 billion dollars exclusive of its
cargo had been sunk;' 7 and that over 20,000 noncombatants had
been drowned in violation of the laws of war. 18 He concluded that it
was "only by means of abolition that menace to the mercantile
marine of the world could be got rid of."' 9
Mr. Balfour of Great Britain conceded that the submarine
served a useful intelligence function and often performed a valid role
in naval warfare. However, he questioned whether there was "any
man who doubt[ed] that if they [were] once let loose to deal with
merchantmen, their powers [would] not in the stress of war be
abused in the future as they [had] been so grossly abused in the
past?"2 He concluded that if the "progress of invention ' 22 in devel-
oping new methods of warfare cannot be halted, at least "we should
do something to make it more humane. "23
France opposed both the prohibition and any limitation on sub-
11. Id. at 478 (remarks of Lord Lee, Great Britain).
12. Id. at 476-78.
13. Id. at 554 (remarks of Mr. Balfour, Great Britain).
14. Id. at 482 (remarks of Lord Lee, Great Britain).
15. Id. at 484.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 478-80.
18. Id. at 480.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 520.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 526.
23. Id.
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marines.24 It argued that criticism should be directed against the
German Navy rather than against "the instrument that they made
use of."28 To a great extent, the destructive impact of the submarine
in the past was due to the fact that anti-submarine warfare had not
been perfected to its present level and these underwater weapons no
longer posed the same threat to surface vessels.26
More importantly, the French emphasized that the submarine
was a relatively inexpensive weapon which could be produced in
large numbers by countries which could not afford large surface na-
vies.2 7 It served as a defensive weapon to protect coastal waters, to
resist and to escape naval blockades and to maintain lines of commu-
nication during wartime.2 8 The French suggested that, in the future,
the submarine might prove effective against airships which were able
to "spread gas over a considerable area of the sea, paralyzing large
ships, possibly squadrons." 29
Thus, France opposed any limitation on the "progress of subma-
rine science. ' 30 It argued that by unilaterally pledging to abolish
submarines, the conferees would place themselves at a disadvantage
as compared to countries which determined to continue to deploy
submarines a.3 Underlying the refusal to prohibit the deployment of
submarines during warfare was a faith in and a willingness to rely
upon technological developments to provide an impenetratable de-
fense.3 2 Admiral De Bon of France extolled the submarine as "an
entirely new weapon of which no one of us can forsee the possible
transformation and growth, perhaps in the near future." 33
Even those who supported the submarine conceded that the sub-
marine "can never be kept from bursting through the moral barrier
which ought to limit its activities and that it will always yield to the
temptation to make unrestricted use of all its power."'3 4 This dire
prediction proved to be correct. During World War II Germany,
once again, claimed that its submarines were exempt from the con-
straints of international law3 5 and engaged in a pattern of unre-
strained, illegal attack against' allied and neutral merchant ship-
24. Id. at 486 (remarks of Mr. Sarruat, France).
25. Id. at 508 (remarks of Admiral De Bon, France).
26. Id. at 514.
27. Id. at 512.
28. Id. at 272 (remarks of Senator Schanzer, Italy).
29. Id. at 516 (remarks of Admiral De Bon, France).
30. Id. at 518.
31. Id. at 538 (remarks of Mr. Sarruat, France).
32. Id. at 518 (remarks of Admiral De Bon, France).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 512.
35. 22 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 559 (1948) [hereinafter TRIAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
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ping.36 These tactics, at times also were adopted by Allied
submarines.3 7
Today, nuclear submarines, with their vulnerable communica-
tion systems, pose one of the most unstable and threatening compo-
nents of the contemporary arms race. These billion dollar weapon
systems, each capable of delivering the equivalent of 1,500 Hiro-
shima bombs,18 have transformed the oceans into a primary
flashpoint for nuclear war.39 There is also the risk of a nuclear ex-
change or accident at sea and no effective defensive tactics have
been developed to counteract these silent, submerged killing
machines.
4 0
In sum, the Washington Conference refused to prohibit the con-
struction, maintenance and deployment of submarines based upon
the fact that the vessel was a rather inexpensive, defensive weapons
system. The conference concluded that the Germans had deployed
submarines in an inhumane fashion against merchant ships, but de-
termined that there was nothing inherently destabilizing or cruel
about using submarines as tools of war. However, during World War
II, the Nazi regime and, at times, the Allies, were unwilling to con-
fine the submarine to defensive purposes and could not resist de-
ploying the vessels in an illegal fashion against merchant traffic.
Today, the submarine's full offensive potential has been real-
ized. It is nuclear powered and equipped and is now a primary com-
ponent of the nuclear triad, capable of penetrating sufficiently close
to its targets to fire missiles with deadly accuracy.
Having failed to demilitarize the ocean floor, the community of
nations today faces the similar challenge of preventing the militari-
zation of space. The allegedly defensive space weapons systems
which presently are being proposed may, in the future, be trans-
formed into central components of a potent offensive weapon system.
III. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Better a Shield Than a Sword
A. The SDI Program
In a recent book,'4 1 famed atomic scientist Edward Teller advo-
cates the abandonment of an international political system in which
36. Id. at 557-60, 563.
37. Id. at 559.
38. See P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO. AMERICAN LAKE: NUCLEAR PERIL IN THE
PACIFIC 216 (1986).
39. See Carothers, Loose Cannons: The Nuclear Navies And The Next War, GREEN-
PEACE Oct.-Dec. 1987, at 6. See generally Arkin & Handler, Nuclear disasters at sea, then
and now, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, July/Aug. 1989, at 20.
40. See id.
41. E. TELLER, BETTER A SHIELD THAN A SWORD. PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE AND
TECHNOLOGY (1987).
Spring 1991 ]
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peace and stability between the superpowers is premised upon the
threat of nuclear annihilation. In its stead, Teller advocates the
adoption of a regime based upon defensive systems capable of inter-
cepting incoming missiles.' 2 The potential development of this defen-
sive system, according to Teller, rests upon the development of laser
or directed energy weapons."3 These weapons might be orbited in
space, launched from the ground and reflected off mirrors mounted
on space platforms, or, upon notice of an attack, launched into space
from submarines based near enemy territory."
Teller also notes the potential of ground-based interceptor mis-
siles and confidently predicts that while incoming missiles are being
intercepted, "the defended population could probably sleep through
an effective defense, even if small nuclear explosives are used."'65
Teller seemingly has an unlimited faith in the potential of tech-
nology,' 6 and that the "genie that produced the sword of modern
times can also produce the shield. If we can make the shield more
effective than the sword, we shall have made the decisive step that
eventually will render the sword obsolete.""'
Teller reportedly had a significant impact on the thinking of
candidate, and later President Ronald Reagan.48 On March 23,
1983, President Reagan announced plans for a strategic defense ini-
tiative,' 9 an announcement which apparently had not been cleared or
fully discussed with his civilian or military advisers5 0 In his nation-
wide address, President Reagan observed that while the superpowers
had maintained peace and security based upon the threat of mutu-
ally-assured nuclear destruction, 51 he was "deeply convinced that the
human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other na-
tions and human beings by threatening their existence."62 The Presi-
dent stated that current technology offered the possibility that secur-
ity, rather than being based upon the threat of instant American
retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, could rest upon the ability to
"intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached
42. Id. at 7, I1, 21-22.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 28.
46. Id. at 29.
47. Id. at 22.
48. See R. SCHEER. WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH AND NUCLEAR WAR 286-
88 (1983).
49. Address by President Ronald Reagan, Peace and National Security, Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 23, 1980), reprinted in DEPT. STATE BULL., Apr. 1983, at 8 [hereinafter Reagan].
See Defending Military Budget, Bush Calls for Cautious Response to Soviet Shifts, Wash.
Post, Feb. 8, 1990, at A30, col. I.
50. R. SCHEER, supra note 48, at 284, 287.
51. Reagan, supra note 49, at 13.
52. Id. at 14.
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our own soil or that of our allies."53 He called upon the scientific
community which developed nuclear weapons to devote their "great
talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the
means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. 5 4
In order to implement his vision, President Reagan announced that
he was initiating a "comprehensive and intensive effort to define a
long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our
ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear
missiles."565
President Reagan's SDI program reflected a fundamental dis-
trust of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. 5" Rather
than relying upon the Soviet's good faith compliance with the terms
of such agreements,5" SDI promised to provide a technologically
guaranteed shield against nuclear attack. 8 In order to maintain the
strategic balance by providing security from a nuclear attack to the
Soviet Union, as well as to the United States, President Reagan later
offered to share SDI technology with the Soviet Union.59
A 1985 White House pamphlet elaborated President Reagan's
plans for SDI60 and stated that the purpose of the program was to
identify those recent technological advances which might be utilized
in designing an effective antiballistic weapons system. 1 These tech-
nologies, according to the White House, may offer the possibility of
a layered defense which utilizes various technologies to destroy at-
tacking missiles during each phase of their flight.62
The White House pamphlet explained that technology previ-
ously had limited antiballistic defense to attacking nuclear warheads
during the terminal phase of their flight using nuclear-tipped inter-
ceptor missiles." Contemporary technologies, however, appeared to
offer non-nuclear options for destroying offensive missiles and war-
heads in all phases of flight.6" These technologies, as enumerated in
the White House document, may provide sensors for identifying and
tracking missiles and nuclear warheads, advanced group and
spaceborne interceptors and directed energy weapons to destroy both
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. In an ominous remark, the President observed that if "paired with offensive sys-
tems" defensive systems can be viewed as "fostering an aggressive policy." Id.
56. Remarks of President Ronald Reagan, SDI. Progress and Promise, White House
briefing (Aug. 6, 1986), reprinted in DEPT..STATE BULL. Oct. 1986, at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, (text of a pamphlet released by the
White House in January 1985) DEPT. STATE BULL., Mar. 1985, at 65.
61. Id. at 66.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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missiles and nuclear warheads in all phases of flight, and the tech-
nology required to coordinate and operate a layered defense. 6
Despite skepticism concerning the possibility of an SDI system,
the White House concluded that the history of the development of
technology "argues strongly against those who make flat statements
that something is technologically impossible." '
B. SDI Technology
Critics have observed that SDI rests more on a faith in prospec-
tive technologies than on a decision to apply existing technologies to
antiballistic defenses.6 7 The successful development of SDI will not
only require multiple scientific breakthroughs, but will then require
that these technologies function flawlessly during an enemy nuclear
attack involving unanticipated strategies and techniques .6
Various scientific studies have expressed skepticism concerning
the feasibility of SDI based upon existing technical limitations and
the capacity of offense to counter defensive technologies.69 Ashton C.
65. Id. at 67. The pamphlet appeared to retreat from President Reagan's vision of an
impenetrable system to protect the population. The pamphlet suggested that SDI might merely
provide a defense for a sufficient number of missiles to insure that the United States main-
tained an effective retaliatory threat. Id. at 67.
66. SDI had pragmatic political rationales. It was a counter to attempts to reduce or to
freeze the United States' nuclear arsenal; shifted the arms race to a new arena in which the
United States perceived it could assert technological superiority; and served to bolster a falter-
ing defense industry. See generally J.E. NOLAN, GUARDIANS OF THE ARSENAL: THE POLITICS
OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 147-82 (1989). Others speculate that it reflects a psychological desire
to create an invulnerable, isolationist America. See generally J. CHACE & C. CARR. AMERICA
INVULNERABLE: THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY FROM 1812 TO STAR WARS (1988).
67. S. LAKOFF & H.F. YORK. A SHIELD IN SPACE? TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS AND THE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 84 (1989).
68. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. DIRECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSES IN
SPACE-A BACKGROUND PAPER 239-40 (1984)(prepared by A.C. Carter) [hereinafter DI-
RECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSES IN SPACE].
69. See Gottfried, The Physicists Size Up SDI, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug.
1987, at 28. See also Sweet, Scientists shoot down Star Wars, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
July/Aug. 1987, at 7.
One of the most promising technologies is space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKVs).
These vehicles are planned to be relatively small missiles capable of accelerating up to veloci-
ties of several kilometers per second. They are to be equipped with homing vehicles capable of
directing the projectile into an offensive missle. Multiple SBKVs would be mounted on a satel-
lite which tracks targets and directs SBKVs. See S. LAKOFF & H.F. YORK, supra note 67, at
95.
Another possible technology is directed-energy weapons, including chemically and electri-
cally driven optical lasers, the free electron laser and the X-ray laser. These devices produce
tight beams of coherent light or other forms of electromagnetic radiation that can be focused
into a tight beam as it travels great distances at the speed of light. Id. at 96-97.
A third technology is particle beams. Beams of charged particles, such as protons and
electrons are accelerated to velocities approaching the speed of light in particle accelerators.
- The beams are directed at a target. See R. BOWMAN, STAR WARS: A DEFENSE INSIDERS CASE
AGAINST THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 28-29 (1986).
Various modes of deployment are under consideration. In some schemes, the laser or other
technology is mounted on a battle station which aims the device at the target. Alternatively, a
laser might be mounted on the ground and the laser produced may be reflected off of a series
of space-based mirrors which relay the beam to the target. S. LAKOFF & H.F. YORK, supra
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Carter, in his study of SDI undertaken for the Office of Technology
Assessment, concludes that "direct-energy weapons and other de-
vices with the specification needed for intercept of ICBMs have not
yet been built in the laboratory, much less in a form suitable for
incorporation in a complete defense system."70
Despite this skepticism, as previously noted, SDI proponents en-
vision that SDI will combine various technologies in a layered de-
fense against ballistic missiles. They anticipate that each layer will
eliminate a portion of the offensive missiles and relatively few mis-
siles will remain to be eliminated in the last phase.7" The flight of a
land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from
the Soviet Union would follow a twenty-five to thirty minute trajec-
tory over the Arctic and cover roughly 10,000 kilometers. 72 These
missiles generally would be equipped with Multiple Independently-
targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and have four phases of flight:
a boost phase during which rocket boosters accelerate missiles to ve-
locities of up to seven kilometers per second; a power-boost phase
during which missiles traverse space and position themselves to re-
lease their warheads and decoys; a mid-course phase during which
the warheads and decoys are released into space and follow a trajec-
tory towards the target; and a terminal phase during which the war-
heads and decoys reenter the atmosphere and are directed towards
the target.
73
The boost phase is the crucial stage of missile flight for defen-
sive purposes. Offensive missiles generally are equipped with multi-
ple warheads and the elimination of these missiles during the boost
phase before the MIRVs are released can significantly reduce the
number of incoming warheads. 74 Offensive missiles are also particu-
larly vulnerable to attack during this boost phase. The missiles have
not yet accelerated and the boosters emit intense infrared radiation
which is easily detected by Satellite, permitting the precise tracking
and attacking of the missile." The boosters consist of light fuel tanks
which are easily punctured during this initial launch phase.7"
note 67, at 97.
The X-ray laser is a potentially powerful device which is powered by a nuclear explosion.
The explosion is used to energize a lasing medium which creates a laser beam consisting of
relatively soft X-rays. In order to protect the X-ray laser from enemy attack, it is proposed
that it be launched (or "popped up") from a submarine into space upon warning of an enemy
attack. Id. at 99.
70. DIRECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSES IN SPACE, supra note 68, at 253.
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72. Bethe, Boutwell & Garwin, BMD Technologies and Concepts in the 1980s, 114
DAEDALUS 53, 55 (1985). Sea launched ballistic missiles can be given a flat trajectory and be
launched from the ocean in close proximity to the target. Id.
73. Id.
74. S. LAKOFF & H.F. YORK, supra note 67, at 94.
75. Id. at 94-95.
76. Id. at 94.
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The attack technologies, however, are easily combatted by fast-
burn boosters which quickly accelerate their payload at a low alti-
tude within the earth's atmosphere.7 Virtually all SDI technologies
experience difficulties in operating in the atmosphere. 7 A shorter
boost phase also means that attack vehicles must be accurately fired
at a rapid rate and reach their target within a relatively brief period
of time.79 Space-based defensive systems, of course, are themselves
susceptible to attack and. disruption by enemy anti-satellite
weapons.80
In the two to five minute post-boost phase, a post-boost vehicle
(a bus) directs the various reentry vehicles along varying trajectories
to their intended target.8" The engines of the bus emit a relatively
low level of energy, so the detection sensors must be extremely sensi-
tive in order to detect the bus. 2 Even when located, the bus is diffi-
cult to incapacitate because it is smaller, less visible and tougher
than the booster.8 3
The midcourse phase lasts between fifteen and twenty min-
utes.84 During this phase the individual reentry vehicles are released
and coalesce into an incoming swarm. 85 Detection and targeting is
difficult since each vehicle emits a low level of infrared radiation and
is roughly the same size and temperature as a human being." The
defense also must be sufficiently sophisticated to locate and separate
nuclear warheads from unarmed decoy warheads which may emit
infrared radiation and quantities of chaff and clouds of infrared-
emitting aerosals.8 7 The Union of Concerned Scientists is skeptical
concerning target identification during this stage and concludes that
this is the most challenging portion of missile defense. 8
77. Id. at 100.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. In order to counter directed-energy weapons, the booster may be spun about its
axis so as to spread out the incoming laser energy; lightweight protective coatings also may be
added to further enhance protection against incoming lasers. Id.
81. Id. at 102. The difficulties of detection and attack could be complicated by incorpo-
rating an independent guidance system into each warhead, eliminating the need for a post-
boost phase bus. Id. A bus also could confound the defense by dispersing either a vast number
of metallic objects (chaff) or a light multi-layered balloon of metallized plastic film, both of
which are designed to confuse the defense. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS. THE FALLACY
OF STAR WARS 60 (1984),
82. S. LAKOFF & HF. YORK, supra note 67, at 102.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Bethe, Boutwell & Garwin, supra note 72, at 57-58.
88. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 81, at 61. Certain delivery systems
are able to evade SDI. Low trajectory submarine launched ballistic missiles situated proximate
to their target and low-flying cruise missiles are able to circumvent SDI. In addition, nuclear
devices can be smuggled into and detonated inside a country's territorial boundaries. Id. at 63-
64.
[Vol. 9:2
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As the reentry vehicles enter their terminal phase, most of the
decoys either will have been incinerated or will have slowed down
and fallen away from the swarm of attack missiles.89 In order to
counter SDI during this terminal phase, warheads can be equipped
with "salvage fusing" in which the warhead automatically detonates
on contact or when it detects an approaching interceptor vehicle or
device.90 Even the detonation of a few nuclear weapons high above
cities will cause significant damage to the population. 91 In addition,
the offense may deploy maneuvering warheads (MaRVs) which are
able to evade defensive interceptor missiles.9"
This complex layered SDI defense requires a sophisticated bat-
tle-management computer system. A reliable computer system must
be designed which is able to alert and direct the defense systems,
distinguish false from true alerts, track targets, discriminate between
warheads and decoys, assess whether targets have been "killed" or
whether additional targeting is required, and coordinate the transi-
tion between the various layers of the defense system. 3 According to
the Union of Concerned Scientists, all of this would require a com-
puter with the capacity to carry out "hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of arithmetic operations per second. ' '94 The necessary
software program would involve ten million or more lines of code.
8
Such a complex system has not yet been constructed and any such
system likely would be subject to undetectable and untestable errors
which may prove fatal during a nuclear attack. 6
In sum, the technical challenges presented by the development
of SDI technology, when combined with the uncertainty created by
offensive countermeasures, make the development of SDI an expen-
sive and uncertain venture. The Union of Concerned Scientists note
that SDI would create "a defense-of stupefying complexity under the
total control of a computer program whose proportions defy descrip-
tion, and whose performance would remain a deep mystery until the
tragic moment when it would be called into action." ' A failure to
intercept five percent of incoming Soviet ballistic warheads would
89. S. LAKOFF & H.F. YORK, supra note 67, at 103.
90. Bethe, Boutwell & Garwin, supra note 72. at 58-60.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. S. LAKOFF & H.F. YORK, supra note 63, at 104-06.
94. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 81, at 146.
95. S. LAKOFF & HF. YORK, supra note 67, at 106.
96. Id. at 105-06. The response time for defense systems in the boost phase may be a
matter of minutes which may necessitate that the SDI system respond automatically or require
that the decision whether to initiate an attack be made by a military officer. There will be
pressure to respond at the first indication of a possible attack since a defensive strike during
the boost phase will eliminate multiple offensive nuclear warhreads and reduce the number of
attacking nuclear warheads during the terminal phase of defense. Id. at 105.
97. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 81, at 44.
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result in the immediate destruction of up to half of the United States
urban population and result in countless other indirect deaths. 98 In
April of 1987, the Council of the American Physical Society released
a statement summarizing its oppostion to SDI:"
1. Even a very small percentage of nuclear weapons pene-
trating a defensive system would cause human suffering and
death far beyond that ever before seen on this planet.
2. It is likely to be decades, if ever, before an effective, reli-
able, and survivable defensive system could be deployed.
3. Development of prototypes or development of SDI com-
ponents in a state of technological uncertainty risks enormous
waste of financial and human resources.100
The statement concluded that the SDI program "should not be
a controlling factor in U.S. security planning and the process of
arms control." 10 1 In the "judgement"'10 2 of the American Physical
Society "there should be no early deployment of SDI
components.' 0
C. SDI And A Nuclear First Strike
Physicists Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod query why the
United States is spending one trillion dollars on a weapons system
that "can't work."'104 They conclude that SDI is not a defensive sys-
tem, but is designed to increase the offensive capability of the United
States nuclear arsenal: "By pairing an offensive capability to disarm
the enemy with the defensive capability to absorb a retaliatory at-
tack, the Star Wars system provides the missing link in a first strike
capability."' 5
The mathematics of the Star Wars strategy is quite clear. Al-
though SDI is of limited utility against a full-scale attack, it may be
quite effective against a limited retaliatory strike launched by a na-
tion which has absorbed a nuclear strike. Dr. Robert M. Bowman,
head of the Institute for Space and Security Studies and former Di-
rector of Advanced Space Programs and Development for the Penta-
gon argues that if a United States nuclear attack destroys ninety-five
percent of enemy missiles, "then the job of boost phase intercept
would be greatly simplified, and the task of each succeeding layer
98. Id. at 163.
99. American Physical Society, APS Council Statement on SDI, ARMS CONTROL TO-
DAY, Jul./Aug. 1987, at 32.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. M. KAKU & D. AXELROD, To WIN A NUCLEAR WAR: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET
WAR PLANS 241 (1987).
105. Id. at 258.
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made more manageable." 10 6 Bowman concludes: "You may protest
that this is nothing but a disarming first strike backed up by a 'Star
Wars' shield and therefore abhorrent to us Americans. And of
course that's exactly what is is."
10 7
The Union of Concerned Scientists points out that various fac-
tors dictate that Star Wars be utilized as a first strike weapon. The
Union observes that SDI is a technologically precarious system that
would be highly vulnerable to enemy attack and to malfunction and
would be of "questionable utility against a full-scale attack, but may
be quite effective against a retaliatory strike."10 8 SDI technology is
also well-suited to offensive deployment against an adversary's space-
based communication and early-warning system, seriously impeding
the adversary's ability to track incoming first-strike missiles and to
coordinate a retaliatory response. 10 9 A first strike would also permit
a deliberate and calculated deployment and targeting of SDI and
help to minimize command errors and system malfunctioning. 10
Thus, while the United States government publicly portrays
SDI as a defensive weapons system, in fact, it is part of a first-strike
strategy." In addition, the emphasis in SDI research has been to-
wards exploring the system's offensive capabilities in space. " Jane
Nolan, in her history of SDI, notes that while the public has ac-
cepted SDI on the basis that it will serve as a defense against nu-
clear weapons,"the actual objectives of the SDI moved programmati-
cally and, to all intents and purposes, strategically into a research
and potential deployment effort aimed at developing ways to improve
the capabilities of offensive nuclear forces."' 1 3
Democratic Congressman George E. Brown of California writes
that the United States is determined to militarily control space and
that the future of space, as viewed by the United States, is "one
where exotic weapons are deployed in massive numbers. The path to
that future is being forged by the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI).1'1 4 Experts anticipate that American dominance of space will
enable the United States to dominate potential aggressors and to
eliminate perceived threats to its national security." 5 Historian E.P.
106. R. BOWMAN, supra note 69, at 45.
107. Id.
108. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 81, at 161.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. J.E. NOLAN, supra note 66, at 21.
112. This argument is developed by Nolan. See generally id. at 4, 21, 25, 29, 32-33.
113. Id. at 21. Nolan argues that few decision-makers in the executive branch ever
viewed SDI as anything more than a political device to gain public support for a program
which could be used, inter alia, to militarize space. Id.
114. Brown, Pentagon usurps civilian space program, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTIST, Nov.
1987, at 26, 28.
115. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. MILITARY SPACE FORCES THE NEXT
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Thompson suggests that space-based "death rays" 116 might be uti-
lized to burn out grain fields, oil storage tanks and other targets and
to reduce an industrial country to the eighteenth century in thirty
minutes.11 Analyst Dietrich Fischer writes that an optical laser with
sufficient power to attack hardened intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) boosters could be used "to start mass urban fires that would
be potentially larger and more intense than those fires created by the
incendiary raids on Hamburg and Dresden in World War II. ''118 He
argues that space-based laser weapons may pose an even greater
threat than today's nuclear arsenals due to their "greater speed and
precision."" 9 Laser beams, when perfected, may be capable of hit-
ting a target at the speed of light, providing the enemy with little, if
any opportunity to prepare for or to respond to an attack. 20 In addi-
tion, there may be minimal hesitancy to use such weapons since, un-
like nuclear arms, they are able to selectively attack targets and do
not create uncontrollable radioactive fallout.1 2' Daniel Deudney con-
cludes that instead of "removing the tightening nuclear noose, space
weapons promise to bring humanity to the edge of cybernetically ini-
tiated annihilation.91 22
IV. The Legality Of SDI
A. SDI And A Nuclear First Strike
A nuclear first strike would be illegal. Article 2(3) of the
United Nations Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that in-
ternational peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 23
Furthermore, article 2(4) states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."' 12 4
The United Nations Charter establishes three exceptions to the
FIFTy YEARS 49-51 (1989). Possible space-based weapons include interceptor rockets; space
mines; railguns which transmit electronic currents and rapidly fire projectiles; and optical laser
weapons. Id. at 112-16.
116. Thompson, Folley's Comet, in STAR WARS 93, 131 (E.P. Thompson ed. 1985).
117. Id.
18. Fischer, The Strategic Defense Initiative As A Cause Of Crisis Instability, 15 J.
LEG. 139, 142 (1989).
119. Id.
120. See generally id.
121. Id. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE CA-
PABILITIES OF SDI SPACE WEAPONS (1987).
122. Deudney, supra note 4, at 104.
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
124. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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prohibition against "the threat or use of force."'' 5 Article 51 recog-
nizes the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.' 12 6 Article 52 recognizes the existence of
regional arrrangements or agencies for addressing matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security. 117 Finally, the
Security Council shall determine and take action against "the exis-
tence of any threat to the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken.' 28
In meeting a threat to the peace, the Security Council may de-
cide "what measures not involving the use of force are to be em-
ployed, 1 29 or it "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necesssary to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity."'" 0 Article 103 states that in the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Member States of the United Nations "under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement, their obligations under the United Nations Char-
ter shall prevail."13
Thus, under the United Nations Charter, the independent exer-
cise of armed force by a nation-state is limited to acts of self-defense
and collective self-defense. According to U.S. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster's well-known formulation in the Caroline case, 132 a
government invoking the right of self-defense must demonstrate a
"necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' 33 Thus, when
defensive action is "greatly in excess of the provocation, as measured
by relative casualties or scale of weaponry, international opinion will
more readily condemn such defense as illegally disproportionate."'" 4
The initiation of an American nuclear strike which does not
constitute an act of self-defense, would clearly violate the United
Nations Charter. The United Nations Resolution on the Definition
of Aggression in article 1 states that "[a]ggression is the use of
125. Id.
126. Id. art. 51.
127. Id. art. 52, para. I.
128. Id. art. 39.
129. Id. art. 41.
130. Id. art. 41.
131. Id. art. 103.
132. 2 B. Moore, The Caroline Case, in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412
(1906).
133. Id. See also 29 BRI. AND FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840-41) (letter from
Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841) quoted in Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on some
Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 129 (1987).
134. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1637
(1984).
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armed force by another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations .*..""' Article 2 emphasizes that the
"first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression." ''6 No
consideration of whatever nature, whether "political, economic, mili-
tary or otherwise"" 7 may serve as a justification for aggression. 38 A
war of aggression under article 5(2) "is a crime against international
peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.' 39
A nuclear strike, even one involving theater or limited nuclear
weapons, launched in retaliation for a conventional attack on the
United States or its allies, "would be totally disproportionate to the
threat presented and therefore constitute an impermissible act of
self-defense . . ."140
A countervalue attack "would constitute a gross violation of the
cardinal principal of proportionality."'' Professor Burns Weston
asks, "where is the military necessity in incinerating entire urban
populations, defiling the territory of neighboring and distant neutral
countries, and ravaging the natural environment for generations to
come simply for the purpose of containing or repelling a conventional
force?" 42 Such a countervalue attack would appear to serve a re-
tributive rather than a defensive purpose and would violate article
51(6) of the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which pro-
vides that, "[a]ttacks against the civilian population or civilians by
way of reprisals are prohibited.' 1 43 A countervalue attack would also
violate the spirit of the Genocide Convention of 1948 which makes
the destruction of groups on the grounds of race, religion, ethnicity
or nationality an international crime. 4
In practice, there is little distinction between the impact of a
countervalue and counterforce nuclear attack. The clustering of mili-
tary targets adjacent to population centers, the inaccuracy of nuclear
135. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXXIX), 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp.(No. 31) at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [Nonbinding].
136. Id. art. 2.
137. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
138. Id.
139. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
140. Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to the 'Paradox' of Nuclear Deter-
rence, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1407, 1441 (1986).
141. Weston, Nuclear Weaspons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassess-
ment, 28 McGILL L.J. 542, 578 (1983). "Countervalue targeting" refers to a nuclear attack
directed against an adversary's cities and industries. "Counterforce targeting" refers to a nu-
clear attack directed against an adversary's armed forces. Id. at 545.
142. Id. at 578.
143. Protocol Respecting the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, Protocol 1, art. 51, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1391, 1413 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions].
144. Lawyers Committee On Nuclear Policy, Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear
Weapons, in A SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 146-49 (B. Weston ed. 1984).
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weapons and the cumulative blast and fallout effects would result in
little practical difference in impact between attacks directed against
civilian and military targets. 145
Thus, an unprovoked nuclear attack would be illegal under the
United Nations Charter. In addition, the initiation of a nuclear
strike in retaliation for a conventional attack, whether based upon
countervalue or counterforce targeting, would result in indiscrimi-
nate suffering and would violate the principles of unnecessary suffer-
ing and proportionality.
Similarly, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, or an act di-
rected to deter an anticipated enemy strike, is not recognized under
international law. Professor Anthony D'Amato notes that a recogni-
tion of the right of anticipatory self-defense would render article 51
of the United Nations Charter "meaningless and in fact open the
door to aggression."' 46 A nation might employ the doctrine of antici-
patory self-defense as a pretext for aggression.' There is also a risk
that a unilateral determination that a nation is the target of an im-
minent attack may be based upon inaccurate or unreliable
information." 8
In sum, a nuclear first strike violates the standards governing
the legitimate use of force. SDI would be a central component of any
United States first strike policy and its deployment for this strategic
purpose would violate international law. To the extent that SDI is
conceived of, designed and deployed as part of a first strike strategy,
it is per se illegal under international law. The development of SDI
thus would appear to violate article 36 of the 1977 Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions which mandates that:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Proto-
col or by any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party." 9
145. See Falk, Toward a Legal Regime for Nuclear Weapons, 28 MCGILL L.J. 519, 528
(1983).
146. D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
584, 588 (1983).
147. Corwin, The Illegality of Nuclear Arms Under International Law, 5 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 271, 286 (1987). It should be noted that article 51 explicitly limits the right of self-defense
to instances of armed attack. Id. at 285.
148. Id.
149. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 143, art. 36 reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
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B. The Outer Space Treaty
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Treaty) is the instrument which
sets forth the rights and duties of nation-states in space and on celes-
tial bodies.' Space-based weapons systems such as SDI are viola-
tive of the Treaty.
Article I declares that the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out
for "the benefit and the interests of all countries,"'' and shall be
"the province of all mankind.' ' 52
Article II affirms the international interest in the exploration
and use of space by specifying that outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to "national appropria-
tion"' 3 by claim of sovereignty by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.1 54
Article III extends international law principles to outer space
and to the moon and other celestial bodies. It stipulates that State
Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, "in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations.' 55 Article III also stresses that this legal regime is
established in the interest of "maintaining peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding."' 5
Thus, the first three articles of the Outer Space Treaty firmly
establish an international regime of cooperation and international
law designed to promote peace and international cooperation in
space. Article IV regulates weaponry in outer space, controls the sta-
tioning of weapons on the moon and on other celestial bodies and is
150. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Space Treaty]. There is no precise
and accepted definition of space. Most definitions locate space somewhere between 80 and 140
kilometers above the earth's surface. See Comment, "Star Wars" Versus Star Laws: Does SDI
Conform To Outer Space Law? 15 J. LEG. 251, 257 (1989). See also Comment, The Treaty
On Outer Space: An Evaluation Of The Arms Control Provisions, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L
259, 270-71 (1968).
151. Space Treaty, supra note 150, art. i.
152. Id. Additional language in article I reinforces the common global interest in the use
and exploration of outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies:
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis
of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free
access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including
thde moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage
international cooperation in such investigation.
Id.
153. Id. art. Ii.
154. Id.
155. Id. art, Ill.
156. Id.
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the article over which debate on the legality of SDI is centered.
.Article IV specifies that State Parties to the Treaty undertake
not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, not to
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner. 157
In addition to the absolute prohibition on nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction in space or on the moon or on other
celestial bodies, the Treaty also specifies that the moon and other
celestial bodies shall be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes."' 58
It specifically prohibits the establishment of military bases, installa-
tions and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of miltitary maneuvers on the moon and other celestial bod-
ies.1 59 However, the use of military personnel for scientific research
or for any other peaceful purpose is not prohibited. 160 In addition,
the use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful explora-
tion of the moon and other celestial bodies is permitted.'
Thus, there appear to be separate requirements for outer space,
where the orbiting or stationing of nuclear weapons is specifically
prohibited,' 62 and for the moon and other celestial bodies, on which
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are banned. 6 a In ad-
dition, the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used "exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes.""4 The "peaceful purposes" provision
should be interpreted to require a complete demilitarization of the
moon and other celestial bodies as well as outer space. This conclu-
sion is dictated by the general purpose of the Outer Space Treaty
and prior application of the phrase "peaceful purposes."
The general intent of the Outer Space Treaty, as stated in arti-
cle I, is to insure that the exploration and use of outer space and the
celestial bodies is undertaken for "the benefit and in the interests of
all countries"'6 5 and that as "the province of all mankind"'6 6 outer
space and the celestial bodies remain "free for exploration and use
157. Id. art. IV. This extends the nuclear test ban treaty which, inter alia, prohibits
nuclear explosions in outer space but which does not address the stationing of weapons. See
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, art. l(l)(a), 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The moon appears to be a celestial body based upon the second paragraph in
article IV which stipulates that the "moon and other celestial bodies" shall be used "exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes." Id.
165. Id. art. I.
166. Id.
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by all States. 167
The intent that outer space and the celestial bodies be used and
explored for the benefit of the global community is reinforced by the
language of the preamble which is central in establishing the intent,
purpose and context of the Treaty.16 8 The preamble emphasizes that
entry into space results in "great prospects opening up before man-
kind", 16 9 stresses the "common interest of all mankind in the pro-
gress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses", 17 0 and proclaims that "the exploration and use of outer space
should be carried out for the benefit of all peoples."
17
The global interest in the use and exploration of outer space and
the celestial bodies is also stressed in article IX which, inter alia,
declares that State Parties shall be guided by the principle of "co-
operation and mutual assistance' ' 17 2 and shall conduct their activities
in outer space, on the moon and on other celestial bodies, with "due
regard to the corresponding interests of all other State Parties to the
Treaty.'
'73
Articles X, XI and XII reinforce the multilateral interest in the
use and exploration of outer space, the moon and other celestial bod-
ies. These articles respectively require that States Parties shall be
afforded an oppportunity to observe the flight of objects launched in
space; 74 that the nature, conduct, location and results of space activ-
ity are disseminated to the greatest extent possible;1 5 and that sta-
tions, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and
other celestial bodies should be open to inspection by all States Par-
ties on the basis of reciprocity.7 6 Article IX further provides for ap-
propriate international cooperation where there is reason to believe
that activity will cause "potentially harmful interference"1 77 with the
peaceful exploration of outer space, the moon and other celestial
bodies. 1' The international interest in the use and exploration of
outer space also is emphasized in article V which requires State Par-
ties to render astronauts all possible assistance based upon their sta-
tus as the "envoys of mankind."' 7 9
167. Id.
168. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, at 289 (1969) (done at Vienna, May 22, 1969; opend for signature, May 23, 1969).
The context of a treaty shall be based upon the text, preamble and annexes. Id.
169. Space Treaty, supra note 150, at Preamble.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. art. IX.
173. Id.
174. Id. art. X.
175. Id. art. XI.
176. Id. art. XII.
177. Id. art. IX.
178. Id.
179. Id. art. V.
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It would be inconsistent with the peaceful and cooperative in-
tent of the latter provisions and the international character of outer
space and the celestial bodies to interpret the "peaceful purposes"
discussed in article IV as contemplating even the defensive militari-
zation of the moon and other celestial bodies. Strict interpretation of
the term "peaceful purposes" requiring demilitarization of space is
also consistent with the use of the term in the Antarctic Treaty.180
Ben Cheng, a leading expert on space law, concludes that three
points emerge from an analysis of the Antarctic Treaty which muta-
tis mutandis appear fully applicable to article IV of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty:
(a) "Peaceful" means non-military.
(b) References to military installations, military ma-
noeuvres and so forth in the provision are exemplicative and not
exhaustive.
(c) The possibility of using military personnel and equip-
ment for scientific research or other peaceful purposes in no way
invalidates point (a) above. 18'
In conclusion, the term "peaceful purposes" in article IV re-
quires the complete demilitarization of the moon and other celestial
bodies. This conclusion rests upon the general peaceful and coopera-
tive intent and context of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the prior
interpretation given to the term "peaceful purposes" in the Antarctic
Treaty as connoting complete demilitarization. This conclusion is
also compelled by the common sense interpretation of "peaceful pur-
poses" as connoting non-military purposes."82
What is the relationship between the demilitarized "peaceful
purposes" regime of the moon and other celestial bodies and the re-
gime in outer space where only nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction are expressly prohibited?' 83 The demilitarized regime ar-
guably extends beyond the moon and other celestial bodies to encom-
180. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. I, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71.
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited,
inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of mili-
tary bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as
the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equip-
ment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.
Id. art. I.
181. Cheng, The Legal Status Of Outer Space And Relevant Issues: Delimitation Of
Outer Space And Definition Of Peaceful Use, II J. SPACE LAw 89, 102 (1983). See also
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art. 2, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 cited in Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons And
The Outer Space Treaty Of 1967, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 454, 474 n. 75 (1978).
182. Markoff, Disarmament And "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions In The 1967 Outer.
Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 7 (1976).
183. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 150, art. IV.
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pass outer space.
The first paragraph of article IV explicitly prohibits the placing
in orbit around the Earth or the installation in outer space of objects
carrying, nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.184
The prohibition on nuclear weapons likely would be interpreted to
prevent the use of X-ray laser weapons in space which utilize a small
nuclear explosion to send intense pulses of X-rays at enemy
missiles. 8
What of the deployment in space of offensive or defensive weap-
ons systems which are not expressly prohibited under article IV?
The United Nations Charter prohibits the deployment of any weap-
ons which are intended for aggressive purposes. This would preclude
putting in orbit or in space weapons which, like SDI, are a compo-
nent of a first-strike nuclear strategy. 8 However, even conventional
weapons systems which are not intended to be used as part of an
aggressive military strategy are prohibited under the Outer Space
Treaty. It would be illogical for those drafting the Treaty to permit
outer space to become militarized while purporting to maintain the
moon and other celestial bodies as demilitarized zones devoted to
"peaceful purposes.' 8 7
The Outer Space Treaty also must be interpreted in light of its
general peaceful and cooperative intent and any single article must
be interpreted "in light of the preceding and subsequent articles."' 88
Professor Marko G. Markoff of the University of Fribourg in Swit-
zerland argues that the "common interests" principle contained in
article I of the Treaty
implies a fixed contractual obligation to refrain from any activ-
ity that would not be in the interests of all states. In our divided
world, any military activities including defensive or "non-aggres-
sive activity",cannot be beneficial for all countries and thus can-
not satisfy the fundamental requirements of the key provision of
Space law.' 89
Professor Markoff concludes that the disarmament of outer space is
"a binding legal obligation resulting from a generally accepted mul-
184. Id. art. IV. Weapons of mass destruction generally are considered to be nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons which result in the indiscriminate killing of a large number of
people in an expansive area. The success of most space-based weapons systems depends, how-
ever, upon their' ability to discriminate between targets. See Smith, Legal Implications Of A
Space-Based Ballistic Missile System, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 52; 70 (1965).
185. Smith, supra note 184, at 70-71. Some expansively interpret the prohibition on
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to encompass a wide-range of space-
based weapons systems. See, Goldman, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Star Wars And Star
Laws, 9 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. III, 117-18 (1986).
186. Smith, supra note 184, at 72.
187. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 181, at 477.
188. B.A. HURWITZ. THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 62 (1986).
189. Markoff, supra note 182, at 21.
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tilateral agreement under international law. It is not merely a politi-
cal issue, as the disarmament of the Earth still is." 19
Central to the vision of a demilitarized spatial environment is
the notion that space remains the heritage of all peoples which may
not be despoiled by military weaponry.' 9' In 1981, the United Na-
tions General Assembly passed resolution 36/97C which urged all
States, particularly those with major space capabilities, to "contrib-
ute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in space."' 92 In
resolution 37/83 the United Nations General Assembly affirmed
that it is the "will of all States that outer space shall be used exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for
an arms race."
'193
It is clear that the consensus of the global community is that
outer space and the moon and other celestial bodies should remain
free from militarization. This consensus lends support to the conten-
tion that SDI and other space-based weapons are prohibited under
international law. 9 4 In analyzing SDI, the late Professor Martin
Feinrider concludes that it would be "disingenuous to pretend that a
multi-billion dollar central element of the U.S. strategic military
posture, which put the Soviet Union at a severe strategic nuclear
disadvantage, is consistent with the U.S. obligation to . ..restrict
itself to peaceful uses of space. SDI, which has as its goal the ability
to render harmless Soviet nuclear-armed missiles, . hardly quali-
fies as 'peaceful,'. .. .
C. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
The United States' deployment of a space-based SDI system
thus would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The development,
testing or deployment of allegedly defensive space-based systems
would also violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [ABM
Treaty] between the United States and the Soviet Union.' 96
The ABM Treaty is based upon the doctrine of mutually as-
190. Id. at 22. See also Zedalis & Wade, supra note 181, at 479.
191.. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 181, at 459.
192. G.A. Res. 36/97C (XXXVI), 36 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/36/756 (1981). See also G.A. Res. 36/99 (XXXVI), 36 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at
76, U.N. Doc. A/36/758 (1958).
193. G.A. Res. 37/83 (XXXVII), 37 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at 290, U.N. Doc.
A/37/669 (1982).
194. The so-called Martens Clause provides that the law of war, inter alia, is defined by
the "laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience." See Hague Convention (no. IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539, I Bevans 631, at Preamble.
195. Feinrider, The Strategic Defense Initiative And International Law, 10 FLETCHER
FORUM 19, 24 (1986).
196. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S2 No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
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sured destruction. The United States and the Soviet Union feared
that the establishment of defensive systems might induce a techno-
logically advanced superpower, confident in its ability to penetrate
the enemy defense and defend against a retaliatory strike, to launch
a first strike. Defense systems might also compel the United States
and the Soviet Union to upgrade their offensive systems in an effort
to overcome the other side's antiballistic missile defenscs and thus
lead to an escalating cycle of technological improvements. The su-
perpowers also anticipated that the limiting of ABM systems would
contribute to the creation of favorable conditions for further negotia-
tions on the limitation of strategic arms.197
In article 1(2), each Signatory undertakes not to deploy ABM
systems for the defense of its territory except as provided under the
Treaty. 98 While generally prohibiting a territorial ABM system, ac-
cording to the Treaty, each Party may deploy two ABM systems.'99
This was later changed to a single-limited system in a 1974 Proto-
col.200 This system is limited to a deployment area of one hundred
fifty kilometers containing one hundred ABM launchers and no more
than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites.201
In article V(1) of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to de-
velop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are "sea-
based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."20 2 Thus, in or-
der to insure that ABM systems possess maximum vulnerability and
are of limited technological sophistication, only fixed land-based sys-
tems are permitted.20 3
For the purpose of the Treaty, an ABM system "is a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajec-
tory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, ... (b)
ABM launchers, . . .; and (c) ABM radars ..... 20 Article 11(1),
by using the phrase "currently consisting of' (interceptor missiles,
launchers and radars) adopts a broad functional approach to ABM
197. Id. at Preamble.
198. Id. art. 1(2).
199. Id. art. Ill.
200. Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974,
art. I, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
201. A1M Treaty, supra note 196, art. 111(a). Each Party undertakes not to transfer
ABM systems to other States and not to deploy such systems outside its national territory. Id.
art. IX. Missiles, launchers or radars, other than those in the ABM system, are not to be given
ABM capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and are not to be tested in an "ABM
mode." Id. art. VI(a). The ABM radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is
to be deployed along the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward. Id. art.
V I(b).
202. Id. art. V(1).
203. Id.
204. Id. art. 11(l).
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systems which does not limit the definition to existing components. 20 5
Modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their compo-
nents206 thus would remain subject to all the limitations of the
Treaty, including article V's prohibtion on sea, air or mobile land-
based systems. Modern ABM systems would still be required to be
deployed in a fixed land-based mode.207
Agreed Statement D applies to ABM systems utilizing technol-
ogies which did not exist at the time of the signing of the Treaty in
1972.208 It addresses the deployment of new land-based, technologi-
cal systems "based on other physical principles"20 9 capable of substi-
tuting for existing ABM interceptor missiles, launchers or radars
which may be "created in the future."21 0 In order to insure that such
systems are deployed "as provided in [A]rticle 11 of the Treaty, ' 21
such systems are subject to "specific limitations"212 and their deploy-
ment in a land-based mode is subject to "discussion. '"213 Thus,
agreed Statement D stipulates that where systems are deployed
which employ technologies which did not exist in 1972 that: such
systems must be land-based; are not to be deployed prior to discus-
sions between the Parties concerning the appropriate limitations on
such systems; and their deployment presumably would require an
amendment to the Treaty.21"
Article V's prohibition on the development, testing and deploy-
ment of space-based systems is thus equally applicable to current
(1972) and future technologies. This conclusion is not only dictated
by the plain language of the Treaty, but is also supported by the
legislative history. The Chayes' note that there "is not a single posi-
tive statement in the legislative history interpreting article V as lim-
ited to current technology."2 5 They go on to conclude that the "ban
205. Chayes & Chayes, Testing And Development Of "'Exotic" Systems Under The
ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper 99 HARVARD L. REv. 1956, 1958 (1986).
206. ABM Treaty, supra note 196, art. Vii.
207. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 205, at 1959.
208. ABM Treaty, supra note 196, at Agreed Statement D.
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems
and their components except as provided in [A]rticle II of the Treaty, the Par-
ties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and
including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on
such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance
with [AIrticle XIII and agreement in accordance with [A]rticle XIV of the
Treaty. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty
Conflict, 28 HARVARD J. INT'L L. 31, 36 (1987).
215. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 205, at 1961.
Spring 19911
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
on development and testing in article V apply comprehensively to all
space-based ABM systems whether composed of 1972-type compo-
nents or using other physical principles." '216 indeed, it would be illog-
ical for the Treaty to permit space-based technologies to be devel-
oped or deployed given that the entire thrust of the Treaty is to
attempt to limit and to restrain strategic arms and weapons develop-
ment.217 Permitting the development or testing of such space-based
systems would createthe risk that a Party might perfect such a sys-
tem, withdraw from or unilaterally repudiate the Treaty and leave
the other Party vulnerable to a first strike attack.21 8 Such a situation
would hardly be conducive to a stable superpower relationship.
The accepted interpretation is that the ABM Treaty does not
limit laboratory research of ABM technologies, even those which
might be deployed in space. 1 9 This interpretation appears to be
based upon the fact that such activity cannot be verified without
unacceptably intrusive measures. 2 0 However, the United States has
quietly extended its research of space-based ABM technologies be-
yond the laboratory by labelling such activities as preliminary test-
ing"' or as technological demonstrations.222 The United States has
also argued that the testing has involved adjuncts (so-called lesser
elements of the ABM system) rather than components22 3 - the test-
ing of which is prohibited under article V. 214 In other cases, the test-
ing of space-based ABM components has been undertaken under the
guise of developing allegedly legal weapons systems such as space-
based, anti-satellite armaments.2 25  -
Gross has observed that twisting "agreed language toward im-
probable meanings, for reasons of expediency, belittles the efforts of
negotiators who seek clear legal language to express principles of
policy. ' 226 The general attempt by the United States to interpret the
216. Id.
217. ABM Treaty, supra note 196, art. XI. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 188, at
1965.
218. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 205, at 1964. A Party may withdraw from the
Treaty upon six months notice based upon extraordinary events related to the Treaty which a
Party considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. ABM Treaty, supra note 179, art.
Xv(2).
219. Smith, supra note 184, at 67.
220. Goldman, supra note 185, at 122.
221. Id.
222. Smith, supra note 184, at 67.
223. Goldman, supra note 185, at 122.
224. ABM Treaty, supra note 196, art. V(l).
225. Goldman, supra note 185, at 122-23. The most comprehensive review of the issues
involved in ABM testing is contained in Chayes, Chayes & Spitzer, Space Weapons: The
Legal Context, 114 DAEDALUS 193, 203-10 (1985).
226. Gross, supra note 214, at 51. See generally Scheffer, Nouveau Law and Foreign
Policy, 76 FOREIGN POL'y 44 (1989). The United States purportedly has accepted a restrictive
approach to interpreting the ABM Treaty. See Excerpts From Speech by Schultz At North
Atlantic Assembly Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
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ABM Treaty to permit the development, testing and deployment of
space-based ABM systems has been characterized by one of the
Treaty negotiators as "sloppy, cursory, unprofessional, and unsub-
stantiated by the text or the negotiating record of the treaty. ' 2 7 He
concludes that the United States'interpretative effort has accorded
priority to the "policy interest over the law. 228
In sum, the proposed defensive SDI system is, in fact, an illegal
first strike weapon which violates the United Nations Charter as well
as the Outer Space Treaty. The development, testing or deployment
of a space-based SDI system is also in violation of the 1972 ABM
Treaty. Even laboratory work on ABM systems, which is purport-
edly permitted under the ABM Treaty, would constitute an illegal
effort to violate the United Nations Charter and the Outer Space
Treaty. While pragmatists may dismiss these conclusions as "soft
law graffiti, ' 229 Professor Feinrider notes that the suggestion that
"law is irrelevant in the face of nuclear might is nothing more than a
claim by the powerful to be above the rule of law, a claim that can-
not coexist with any pretense of civility and order." 30
The importance of halting SDI and other -space-based weaponry
is part of a larger challenge to control destructive technology and to
subordinate it to the service of humanity. In 1970, Yale law profes-
sor Charles A. Reich published his underground classic, The Green-
ing Of America.231 Although perphaps overly-sanguine concerning
the future of American society, Professor Reich's admonition con-
cerning technology still rings true:
Beyond the industrial era lies a new age of man. The es-
sence of that age must be the end of the subjugation of man, the
end of his subordination to the machine, and the beginning of
the subjugation of the machine -the use of technology to cre-
ate a still higher level of life, but one based upon values beyond
the machine. The politics of controlling man becomes unimpor-
tant, the politics of controlling machines and organizations be-
come the new concern of government .... 232
V. Scientific Responsibility and SDI
The history of military weaponry parallels the evolution of sci-
entific knowledge.233 Scientists have not only responded to requests
227. R.L. GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS LAW THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM
TREATY 103 (1987).
228. Id. at 104.
229. Feinrider, supra note 195, at 23.
230. Id.
231. C.A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
232. Id. at 386.
233. B. BRODIE & F.M. BRODIE. FROM CROSSBOW TO H-BOMB (1973).
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by the military and politicians for improved and novel weapons, but,
at times, they have taken the initiative in pointing out the military
potentialities of scientific developments. One of the most well-known
examples of scientific initiative in proposing and developing weapons
was Albert Einstein's August 1939 letter to President Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt which led to the establishment of the Manhattan Pro-
ject and the development of the atomic bomb.13 1
Scientists traditionally have been viewed as neutral technicians
and their involvement in military research and development has been
viewed as raising few moral issues or dilemmas.2 35 Following World
War II, for instance, the Allied Powers were quick to recruit high-
level German scientists, many of whom were Nazis, into their own
space and weapons programs. 36
Few scientists are willing to risk the opprobrium of their col-
leagues and question the propriety of their actions. Those who dis-
sent are often ostracized and professionally sanctioned. In 1949,
Robert Oppenheimer, scientific director of the Manhhttan Project
and Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory
Committee, was among a group of scientists who opposed the devel-
opment of the hydrogen bomb.2 37 Partly in retribution for his opposi-
tion, Oppenheimer's security clearance was revoked and he was
purged from the Atomic Energy Commission on the grounds he
posed a risk to national security.23 This crippling blow to the career
of a prominent scientist such as Oppenheimer, made clear that it
would be considered unpatriotic and unprofessional to question nu-
clear weapons policy.2 39
Another example of scientific dissent against advanced weap-
onry occurred in 1957 when Nobel Prize winning scientist Linnus
Pauling organized professional opposition to the atomospheric testing
of atomic weapons. 240 In response to Pauling's activities, he was la-
belled as a communist and summoned before the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee. 2 1 Although no evidence was produced
that Pauling was part of a subversive conspiracy, he was denied fed-
234. See H.C. HILGARTNER, R.C. BELL & R. O'CONNOR. NUKESPEAK 22-23 (1982). See
generally R. RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB (1986).
235. See generally R. PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS
(1988). See also R. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE (1986). The process of rationalization of immoral behavior is explored in S. MIL-
GRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1969).
236. See T. BOWER, THE PAPERCLIP CONSPIRACY THE HUNT FOR NAZI SCIENTISTS
(1987).
237. H. WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMON, KILLING OUR OWN, THE DISASTER OF AMERICA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION 52-53 (1982).
238. Id. at 84.
239. Id. at 93.
240. Id. at 98.
24 I. Id.
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eral funds to support his research for nearly two decades. 2" Ironi-
cally, he later was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to
halt nuclear testing. 43
Over the course of the last few decades, it has become increas-
ingly recognized that the responsibility for ending the arms race
should be extended to the scientific community as well as to nation-
states.2 4 It has been observed that the global "arms culture ' 245
which employs half a million scientists and accounts for half of all
research and development expenditures is a perversion of the scien-
tific mission.2 46 World-wide, military research and development is
growing at twice the rate of military spending as a whole; while total
military spending exceeds the total combined spending for items
such as new energy sources, the improvement of human health, rais-
ing agricultural productivity and controlling pollution. 7
In 1981, Pope John Paul II commented on the responsibility of
scientists in an address at the United Nations University in Hiro-
shima Japan.248 Pope John Paul II praised scholars and research
workers who "express the anxiety of the scientific world in the face
of an irresponsible use of science, which too often does grievous dam-
age to the balance of nature or brings with it the ruin and oppression
of man by man. '"249
The Pope concluded that the application of science is not "neu-
tral ' 250 and "the time has come for our society and especially for the
world of science to realize that the future of humanity depends on
our collective moral choices. "251 The Pope called for the placing of
all scientific resources "at the service of peace"25 2 and towards the
building of a new society which will eliminate the causes of "fratrici-
dal wars by generously pursuing the total progress of each individual
and of all humanity. '253
Various non-binding international proclamations and instru-
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See generally INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN IS-
SUES, WINNING THE HUMAN RACE 22 (1988) (an independent group of eminent persons re-
porting to the United Nations on the New International Humanitarian Order).
245. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FU-
TURE 298 (1987) (a United Nations Commission requested to formulate a long-term environ-
mental strategy).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Address by Pope John Paul II, Moral Choices for the Future, United Nations Uni-
versity, Hiroshima, Japan (Feb. 25, 1981), reprinted in NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT KEY STATE-
MENTS OF POPES. BISHOPS, COUNCILS AND*CHURCHES 55 (P. Heyer ed. 1982).
249. Id. at 57.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 58.
253. Id.
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ments emphasize that science and technology must turn away from
militarism and address humanitarian concerns. Principle 18 of the
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conferance on the
Human Environment 254 states that science and technology must be
applied for the solution of environmental problems and for the "com-
mon good of mankind." 25 5
The Cocoyoc Declaration adopted by a 1974 United Nations
environmental and trade conference observes there is a "reservoir of
underutilized creative energy in the whole scientific community of
the world, and that it should be more focused on research for the
satisfaction of fundamental needs. 256
Perhaps the most forceful denunciation of the application of
contemporary science and technology to the development and refine-
ment of weapons systems is the 1978 Poona Indictment adopted, by
the participants at the meeting of the World Orders Models Project
in Poona, India.2 57 (Indictment) The Indictment concludes that in no
area has the perversion of science and technology reached "higher
levels of obscenity than in the technology of mass destruction and
repression. 2528 The Poona Indictment concludes that the "scientific
enterprise must henceforth be directed especially towards the needs,
skills and knowledge of the majority .of the underprivileged peoples
of the world, especially those in the Third World. '259
The most authoritative document on scientific responsibility is
the 1975 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Pro-
gress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind.26°
Although addressed to States, the Declaration impliedly imposes a
duty upon scientists to insure that States comply with its provisions.
Paragraph 1 proclaims that States shall promote international co-
operation to ensure that "the results of scientific and technological
developments are used in the interests of strengthening international
254. The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human En-
vironment, (Done at Stockholm, June 16, 1972)(Report of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972)
reprinted in I I I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
255. Id. at Principle 18.
256. The Cocoyoc Declaration (Adopted by the participants in the United Nations Envi-
ronmental Program, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Symposium on
Pattern of Resource Use, Environment and Development Strategies, Cocoyoc, Mexico, Oct. 8-
12, 1974), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 415,
420 (B.H. Weston, R.A. Falk & A.A. D'Amato eds. 1980) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
See also, Declaration on the Third World and the Human Environment (Oi Committee Decla-
ration) (Adopted by the participants in the Conference on Problems of the Third World and
the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 1972) reprinted in id. at 427, 431.
257. The Perversion of Science and Technology: An Indictment (Poona Indictment)
(Adopted by the participants in the fourteenth meeting of the World Order Models Project
held in Poona, India, July 2-10, 1978) reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, at 421.
258. Id. at 423.
259. Id. at 424.
260. G.A. Res. 3384 (XXX) Supp. (No. I) at 86, U.N. Doc A/1033 (1975).
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peace and security, freedom and independence, and also for the pur-
pose of the economic and social development of peoples and the real-
ization of human rights and freedoms in accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations."26
Paragraph 4 stipulates that States shall refrain, inter alia, from
the use of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose
of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States,
interfering in their internal affairs or waging aggressive wars.262
Such acts are not only a "flagrant violation of the Charter of the
United Nations and principles of international law, but constitute an
inadmissible distortion of the purposes that should guide scientific
and technological developments for the benefit of mankind. 263
At times, these indictments of scientific complicity in the devel-
opment of weapons have gone beyond moral and ethical condemna-
tion. The 1978 Dehli Declaration adopted by the participants in an
international workshop on disarmament concluded that scientists
have a special responsibility and a crucial role in disarmament and
that the involvement of scientists in perpetuating an unjust world
order "amounts to complicity in crimes against humanity. 264
While there is arguably an international consensus, as, reflected
in these documents, against scientific involvement in weapons devel-
opment- particularly weapons of mass destruction- there are signifi-
cant incentives for scientists to continue their involvement in such
activity. SDI presents significant funding opportunities and "could
be the leading area of growth for the national military contractors in
the 1990s." ' 66 SDI research also offers the challenge of professional
competition, recognition and the opportunity to serve one's
country.66
Some scientists who have criticized or who have refused to par-
ticipate in SDI research have been labelled as security risks and ei-
ther terminated from their positions or denied research grants. 67
Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the depth of opposition to the
"Star Wars" program, a group of scientists at the University of Illi-
261. Id. para. 1.
262. Id. para. 4.
263. Id.
264. Disarmament For A Just World: Declaration Of Principles, Proposal For A Treaty,
And Call For Action (Dehli Declaration) (Adopted by the participants in the International
Workshop on Disarmament, New Delhi, March 27-31, 1978) reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 256, at 406, 409.
265. Hartung, Star Wars pork barrel, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTIST, Jan. 1986, at 20. See
also Vandercook, SDI show hits the road, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1986, at 16.
266. See generally W.J. BROAD, STAR WARRIORS A PENETRATING LOOK INTO THE
LIVES OF THE YOUNG SCIENTISTS BEHIND OUR SPACE AGE WEAPONS (1985).
267. See Gurman, Walking away from Star Wars, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, April
1988, at 6. See also Gollon, SDI funds costly for scientists, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan.
1986, at 24.
Spring 1991]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:2
nois at Urbana-Champaign pledged to refuse to work on SDI re-
search programs."' As of January 1986 the pledge had been signed
by 2,100 science and engineering faculty and other senior research-
ers as well as by roughly 1,600 graduate students and junior re-
search staff. 69 By November 1985, fifty-six percent of the faculty at
the nation's fourteen top-ranked physics departments had signed the
pledge.
2 70
The pledge was based upon both technical and strategic objec-
tions to SDI and concluded that SDI is a step toward the type of
weapon and strategy likely "to trigger a nuclear holocaust." '271 Sig-
natories pledged neither to "solicit nor accept SDI funds ' 2 72 and en-
couraged "others to join us in this refusal. '2 73
Two of the drafters of the pledge, in describing their motivation,
explained that they entered science "to advance knowledge- not to
make a living by selling quack nostrums, particularly lethal ones, to
a frightful public. '27 4 By disseminating the pledge they hoped to
"hold back the Star Wars program and stir up enough debate to stop
it before its dependent constituency grows beyond the point of no
return."
75
268. See Kogut & Weissman, Taking the pledge against Star Wars, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Jan. 1986, at 27.
269. Id. at 28.
270. Id. at 30. As of June 1986, 3,700 faculty members and 2,800 graduate students in
the physical sciences and engineering, including the majority of faculty in fifty-nine leading
physics departments, had signed the pledge. Sweet, Scientists shoot down Star Wars, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, July/Aug. 1987, at 7. The pledge stated:
We the undersigned scientists and engineers, believe that the Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI) program (commonly known as Star Wars) is ill-conceived
and dangerous. Anti-ballistic-missile defense of sufficient reliability to defend the
population of the United States against a Soviet attack is not technically feasi-
ble. A system of more limited capability will only serve to escalate the nuclear
arms race by encouraging the development of both additional offensive overkill
and an all-out competition in anti-balistic-missile weapons. The program willjeopardize existing arms control agreements and make arms control negotiation
even more difficult than it is at present. The program is a step toward the type of
weapons and strategy likely to trigger a nuclear holocaust. For these reasons, we
believe that the SDI program represents, not an advance toward genuine secur-
ity, but rather a major step backwards.
Accordingly, as working scientists and engineers, we pledge neither to solicit
nor accept SDI funds, and we encourage others to join us in this refusal. We
hope together to persuade the public and Congress not to support this deeply
misguided and dangerous program.
Kogut & Weissman, supra note 268, at 28.
271. Kogut & Weissman, supra note 268, at 28. Anti-SDI Pledge. quoted in Kogut &
Weissman, supra note 245, at 28.
272. Id.
273. Id. SDI was described in the pledge as increasing the trend towards the militariza-
tion of science; accelerating the arms race; blocking arms control, wasting resources and in-
creasing the possibility of a nuclear first strike. Id.
274. Id. at 30.
275. Id. Those signing the pledge hoped their refusal to accept SDI research funds
would lend moral weight to their opposition; serve to insulte them from personal complicity in
what they viewed as a dangerous and misguided research program; and called into question the
claim that the scientific community overwhelmingly endorsed SDI. Id. at 28.
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Scientists, as suggested by those who signed the pledge against
SDI, have a moral as well as a possible international legal responsi-
bility to refrain from voluntary involvement in the development of
weapon systems, such as SDI, which are intended to form part of an
illegal first strike strategy or which are violative of international
treaties. Professor G.C. Weermantry of Monash University in Aus-
tralia concludes that when scientists anticipate that their research
will be used for "dangerous and destructive purposes:" '276
it is naive for them to plead that they exercised their freedom of
research in the expectation that this knowledge would be left
unused despite its great commercial or military value. They bear
the same responsibilities that would normally attach to any per-
son who forsees the reasonable probability of damage from his
action but who nevertheless chooses to act in the manner pro-
ductive of such probable harm. 7
VI. Scientific Responsibility and the Nuremberg Principles
A. The Liability of Upper Echelon Officials
Following World War II, the Allied Powers resolved to prose-
cute the major Nazi war criminals before a multinational tribunal.2 78
During the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter at the London Con-
ference of 1945 [Charter], United States Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson stated that the Allies intended to prosecute "the
planners, the zealots who put this thing across . . . the emphasis
should be on the planning level rather than on the mere fact that at
some point one . . . participated in carrying it out. '12 7
Twenty-two defendants were prosecuted at Nuremberg and
were variously indicted and convicted for Crimes against Peace
(waging aggressive wars), 280 War Crimes281 and Crimes against Hu-
276. G.C. WEERMANTRY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY 153
(1987).
277. Id.
278. Minutes of Conference Session of July 16, 1945 (Document XXX) in REPORT OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON MILITARY TRIALS 246, 250-51 [hereinafter REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON].
279. Minutes of Conference Session of July 24, 1945 (Document XLVII) in REPORT OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON at 360, 363.
280. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 461-68 (1948). Arti-
cle 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter defined Crimes against Peace:
(a) Crimes against peace: Namely, planning, preparation, intitiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 258
(Supp. 1945) art 6(a) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
281. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 496-98. Article 6(b)
of the Nuremberg Charter defined War Crimes:
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manity.282 In retrospect, perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Nuremberg judgment is that it established individual liability for
acts violative of international law.2 83
The Nuremberg Tribunal stated that violations of international
law "are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced." '84 Individuals cannot obtain immu-
nity from liability based upon the fact that they are government
leaders or that they are acting pursuant to obligations imposed by
domestic law." 28  The Tribunal observed that "the very essence of
the Charter is that individuals have international duties which tran-
scend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual
state. 12 8 6 An individual "cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the state, if the state in authorizing
action moves outside its competence under international law.12 8 7 The
Tribunal also rejected the "superior orders" defense for crimes under
the Charter, ruling that superior orders could only be considered "in
mitigation of punishment.2 88
The Tribunal thus extended international criminal liability to
individuals, narrowed the "superior orders" defense and rejected-the
"act of state" defense which provided international criminal immu-
nity to State officials. This far-reaching extension of individual liabil-
ity, however, is in stark contrast to the Tribunal's narrow definition
of the scope of individual liability for substantive offenses under the
Charter which had the effect of limiting criminal liability to a nar-
rowly circumscribed leadership cadre. 89
(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of wars. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deporta-
tion to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occu-
pied territory, murder or ill-treatement of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or priviate property, wanton destruc-
tion of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 280, art. 6(b).
282. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 33, at 498. Article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter defined Crimes against Humanity:
(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 257, art. 6(c).
283. T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 82 (1970).
284. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 466.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. The Tribunal also ruled that the test for superior orders is not the existence of
an order, but whether a "moral choice was in fact possible." Id.
289. See generally infra notes 290-317 and accompanying text.
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Count One charged the defendants with involvement in a com-
mon plan or conspiracy to wage an aggressive war.29 0 The Tribunal
adopted a narrow definition of conspiracy which limited liability to
those high echelon officials who were present at planning sessions for
wars of aggression.2"9 The conspiracy must be "clearly outlined in its
criminal purpose," 29 it "must not be too far removed from the time
of decision and of action,' '2 s and a "concrete plan"' 29' to wage war
must have existed.9
Count Three punished war crimes.29 6 In order to sustain a con-
viction under this count, the Tribunal appears to have required that
the evidence "sufficiently connect[ed] ' 297 a defendant with the plan-
ning, ordering, inciting or commission of war crimes.2 98 Mere knowl-
edge or communication of orders or the proposal of discriminatory
laws was not considered to be sufficient to support a conviction.2 99
The Tribunal was also reluctant to impose criminal liability on
Germans for acts which also had been engaged in by Allied
Powers.300
The Tribunal did not distinguish in its judgment between those
acts which comprised War Crimes and those which constituted
Crimes against Humanity and the verdicts on Counts Three and
Four were identical.30' It narrowed the scope of Crimes against Hu-
manity by limiting its jurisdiction over such crimes to those which
had occurred from 1939 onwards.302 Although "ruthlessly carried
out,"3 ' the repression of German civilians prior to 1939 was not car-
ried out in "execution of, or in connection with" 0 " either a Crime
against Peace or a War Crime and thus did not constitute Crimes
against Peace." ' 5 Thus, acts committed prior to 1939 were outside
290. Id. at 467-69.
291. Id. at 467-68.
292. Id. at 467.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 468.
295. Id. Count Two, participation in the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of
an aggressive war served to convict some of the defendants acquitted on the narrowly-drawn
conspiracy charge who had helped to formulate and direct Nazi military tactics and occupa-
tion plans. Id. at 544-76. Those acquitted on Count One who were convicted on Count Two
included Frick, Id. at 544-47; Funk, Id. at 549-52; Donitz, Id. at 556-60; and Seyss-Inquart,
Id. at 574-76.
296. Id. at 469-96.
297. Id. at 529.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 558-59 (acquittal of D6nitz of the war crimes charge of waging unrestricted
submarine warfare).
301. See generally id. at 496-98, 524-87.
302. Id. at 498.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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the Tribunal's jurisdiction.3 0 6
Article Nine of the Nuremberg Charter declared that the Tri-
bunal had the discretion to declare (in connection with any act of
which an individual may be convicted) that a group or organization
of which an individual was a member was a criminal organization.3 0
Article Ten permitted the competent national authority of any Sig-
natory to bring individuals to trial before national military or occu-
pation courts for the crime of membership in a criminal organiza-
tion.308 The Tribunal determined that a criminal organization under
the Nuremberg Charter must be bound together for a common pur-
pose and must have been formed or used in connection with crimes
punished under the Nuremberg Charter.30 9 Membership alone was
not sufficient to constitute criminality.3 10 The Tribunal limited liabil-
ity to those voluntary members who had knowledge of the criminal
purposes or acts of the organization and to those conscripted mem-
bers who were personally implicated in the commission of criminal
acts under the Charter.3 1 1 In its final judgment, the Tribunal thus
narrowed its declarations of criminality to those coherent organiza-
tions whose members were directly and consistently involved in the
commission of crimes under the Charter. 1 ' The Tribunal was reluc-
tant to issue declarations of organizational criminality, explaining
that criminal guilt is personal and that mass punishment should be
avoided. 313
Thus, the Tribunal generally limited the scope of liability under
the Charter to high echelon officials who directly planned, ordered
and carried out criminal acts. Nazi atrocities and aggression thus
were implicitly portrayed as the acts of those with "brains and au-
thority" 3 1 4 and of "station and rank"3 15 who did not soil their "hands
with blood." 316 They "were men who knew how to use lesser folks as
tools . . . the planners and designers, the inciters and leaders with-
out whose evil architecture the world would not have been for so
306. Id.
307. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 280, art. 9.
308. Id. art. 10.
309. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 500.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Declarations of criminality were issued against the Leadership Corps (administra-
tive branch) of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo (internal political police), the SD (intelligence
agency of the security police), and the SS (internal security police). Id. at 501-17. The Tribu-
nal declined to issue such declarations against the SA (Nazi party militia), the Reich Cabinet,
and the General Staff and High Command. Id. at 517-23.
313. Id. at 500.
314. 2 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 104 (1947) (opening argument
of Justice Jackson) [hereinafter 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
315. Id. at 105.
316. Id.
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long scourged with the violence and lawlessness and wracked with
the agonies and convulsions of this terrible war.
317
B. The Liability of Low Echelon Officials and Private Individuals
The Nuremberg Tribunal did not directly address the criminal
liability of those below the policy level. In the Flick case,3"8 however,
a United States Military Tribunal rejected the argument that inter-
national law "is a matter wholly outside the work, interest and
knowledge of private individuals." 319 The Tribunal ruled that:
International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does
ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal when done by
an officer of the Government are criminal also when done by a
private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in
quality. The offender in either case is charged with personal
wrong and punishment falls on the offender in propria persona.
-The application of international law to individuals is no novelty
. . . . There is no justification for a limitation of responsibility
to public officials.320
However, despite the general acceptance of the fact that Hitler
relied upon others to execute his plans,321 and that "the guilt of Ger-
many will not be erased for the people of Germany share it in large
measure ... , 322 post-Nuremberg war crimes tribunals were reluc-
tant to extend criminal liability for Crimes against Peace below the
policy-making level. In 1948, an American tribunal in the I.G.
Farben case 323 observed that, of necessity, the great majority of
Germans supported the waging of war in some degree;3 24 but that
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had limited liabil-
ity "high among those who lead their country into war. '132 The Tri-
bunal noted that an extension of liability below the policy-making
level "would lead far afield." 2 ' There could be no "practical limita-
tion on criminal responsibility that would not include, on principle
317. Id.
318. Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others, 9 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM I (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, American Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, Germany 1947) [hereinafter The
Flick Trial].
319. Id. at 18.
320. Id.
321. 19 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 35, at 430 (closing
argument of Justice Jackson) [hereinafter 19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
322. Id. at 434 (closing argument of Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor of the
United Kingdom).
323. The i.G. Farben Trial, 10 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. I (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, American Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, Germany 1948) [hereinafter The 1.G. Farben
Trial].
324. Id. at 38.
325. Id. at 39.
326. Id. at 38.
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the private soldier on the battlefield, the farmer who increased his
production of foodstuffs to sustain the armed forces, or the housewife
who conserved fats for the making of munitions. 32 7 Under these cir-
cumstances, "the entire manpower of Germany could, at the uncon-
trolled discretion of the indicting authorities, be held to answer for
waging wars of aggression. That would, indeed result in the possibil-
ity of mass punishment." '28
As Judge Anderson observed in the Krupp trial, 329 this would
lead to the morally and legally "obnoxious "330 and unprecedented
application of mass punishment.3 3 1 Judge Anderson observed that
this would mean that,in the future, citizens would be obliged to de-
termine at their peril, whether the war in which they were required
to participate was legally justified.33 2 It would also require the pri-
vate citizen, under the heat of the moment, to weigh the relevant
facts and law and to make the unhappy choice between loyalty to
their country and adherence to international law. 333 This was viewed
as imposing a particularly heavy burden on citizens, given the ambi-
guity of the pertinent legal standards. 3 4
Underlying this refusal to extend liability beyond the policy
level was the belief that the German people had been exposed to
Nazi propaganda and had no knowledge of the criminal activities of
the totalitarian Third Reich.333 Those who did protest were subject
to repression and there was thought to be no possibility for indepen-
dent criticism or expression.33 In addition, there was the pragmatic
realization that wide-spread trials would create animosity and
destabilize German society; and that the Allies required a strong
Germany which would serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansion-
ism. 337 Many lower-level Nazis possessed valuable skills, had demon-
strated anti-Soviet credentials and were viewed as more reliable than
the left-wing opponents of the Third Reich.33 8
The acquittal of Albert Speer at the Nuremberg trial estab-
lished principles which were relied upon as precedents for the acquit-
tal of various individuals in the private sector in later war crimes
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. The Krupp Trial, 10 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 69, 109 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, American Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, Germany 1948) (concurring opinion of Presiding
Judge H.C. Anderson) [hereinafter The Krupp Trial].
330. Id. at 128.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. The I.G. Farben Trial, supra note 323, at 39.
334. The Krupp Trial, supra note 329, at 128 (Anderson J.).
335. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 423.
336. Id.
337. See generally Lippman, The Denaturalization Of Nazi War Criminals In The
United States: Is Justice Being Served? 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169, 173-77 (1985).
338. Id.
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trials."3 9 In 1942, Speer was appointed Minister for Armaments and
Munitions and later served as Plenipotentiary General for Arma-
ments and was a member of the Central Planning Board.34 ° He also
served in the Reichstag from 1941 until the end of the war.3 41
The Nuremberg Tribunal noted that Speer became head of the
armament industry "well after all of the wars had been commenced
and were under way"34 and thus had no role in or knowledge of the
planning session for wars of aggression. 43 In addition to his acquit-
tal under Count One of engaging in a common plan to wage wars of
aggression, he was acquitted under Count Two of waging an aggres-
sive war.3 44 The Tribunal noted that Speer's "activities in charge of
German armament production were in aid of the war effort in the
same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war
... . "4 The Tribunal concluded that it was "not prepared to find
that such activities involve engaging in the common plan to wage
aggressive war as charged under Count One, or waging aggressive
war as charged under Count Two. "346
The Speer decision thus established that the production of
armaments did not per se constitute criminal involvement in a com-
mon plan to initiate, plan or prepare a war of aggression; or the wag-
ing of such a war. 47 There was, however, a suggestion that knowl-
edge of aggressive war plans combined with responsibility for the
industrial production or distribution of armaments would be suffi-
cient to constitute involvement in a common plan to wage an aggres-
sive war.3 8
C. The Prosecution of Industrialists and the International Legal
Liability of Scientists
The Allied military tribunals convened following the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg generally adhered to the
339. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 576-79.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 552-56 (judgment per Schacht). In the case of Schacht, who until 1943 was
a major figure in Germany's rearmament program, the Nuremberg Tribunal observed that
"rearmament of itself is not criminal under the Charter." Id. at 554. To constitue a Crime
against Peace, the Tribunal ruled that it must be demonstrated that Schacht "carried out this
rearmament as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars." Id. The Tribunal ruled that it
could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether "Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi
aggressive plans." Id. at 555. The Tribunal, however, did note that Schacht, "with his intimate
knowledge of German finance, was in a particularly good position to understand the true sig-
nificance of Hitler"s frantic rearmament and to realize that the economic policy adopted was
consistent only with war as its object." Id. at 555.
Spring 1991]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Speer precedent in acquitting industrialists of war crimes.3 49
The Krupp Cases50 involved the prosecution of officials of the
principal German manufacturer of armaments and warships.3 51
Judge Anderson noted that Speer, who was head of the industrial
program for the production of armaments, had been acquitted. 352
Under these circumstances, Judge Anderson argued that it would be
unprecedented to hold that the activities of private citizens in
the production of armament constituted waging of war when
those of the official supervising those activities did not constitute
that offence. So far as I am able to perceive, there is no reasona-
ble basis for making such a distinction . . .-.
Allied war crime tribunals also acquitted industrialists on
charges of involvement in a common plan to wage an aggressive war
based upon their lack of formal involvement in and specific or gen-
eral knowledge of Nazi war plans.354 In the I.G. Farben trial, 855 a
United States military tribunal acquitted Nazi Karl Krauch, a major
figure within the chemical manufacturer I.G. Farben and Plenipo-
tentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production, of
conspiracy to commit a Crime against Peace. 356 The Tribunal con-
cluded that Krauch had not participated in the planning of aggres-
sive wars and had no specific or general knowledge of such plans.157
The plans for war, according to the Tribunal, "were made by and
within a closely guarded circle and the accused Krauch was excluded
from membership in that circle." 358
Although the Tribunal noted that Krauch may have been
"alarmed at the accelerated pace that armament was taking," 35' it
concluded that Krauch did not realize that, in addition to strength-
ening Germany, he was participating "in making the nation ready
for a planned attack of an aggressive nature. '' 360 Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that Krauch
349. See Zeck, Nuremberg: Proceedings Subsequent To Goering Et. Al., 26 N.C. L.
REV. 350 (1948).
350. The Krupp Trial, supra note 329.
351. Id. at 76-81.
352. -Id. at 127.
353. Id. Judge Anderson noted that the defendants' activites in connection with the war
consisted primarily in the performance of their duties as employees engaged in the manufac-
ture and sale of armaments and in their membership in economic associations organized to
assist the war effort. He concluded that to hold that such activities constitute waging an agres-
sive war would constitute an ex post facto law. Id.
354. The i.G. Farben Trial, supra note 323, at 17.
355. Id. at I.
356. Id. at 36.
357. Id. at 17-18.
358. Id. at 17.
359. Id. at 18.
360. Id.
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contributed his efforts in much the same manner and measure as
thousands of other Germans who occupied positions of impor-
tance below the level of Nazi civil and military leaders who were
tried and condemned by the International Military Tribunal. 6 '
In sum, the post-war Allied military tribunals were reluctant to
imply knowledge to private industrialists of German aggressive war
plans and acquitted them of war crimes charges. They determined
that such individuals lacked both specific and general knowledge of
German war plans and did not imply any such knowledge based
upon the volume or nature of German arms production or the indi-
viduals' economic or political responsibilities. 362
Private industrialists, however, were not insulated from interna-
tional criminal liability in those instances in which they knowingly
and voluntarily cooperated in illegal governmental activities or in the
provision of toxic substances used to inflict harm. In the Zykion B
case,313 two of the defendants were convicted and executed for pro-
viding poison gas to concentration camps. 36' The British military
court accepted the prosecution's theory that "knowingly to supply a
commodity to a branch of the State which was using that commodity
for the mass extermination of Allied civilian nationals was a war
crime, and that the people who did it were war criminals for putting
the means to commit the crime into the hands of those who actually
carried it out.' 353 The Court concluded that the defendants were
aware that the vast quantity of poison gas they were supplying was
not being used exclusively for delousing clothing or for the purpose
361. Id. The Tribunal conceded that German rearmament was in excess of that required
for defensive purposes. However, it observed that Krauch and other defendants were not mili-
tary experts and they thus were not equipped to evaluate the signficance of German rearma-
ment. Id. at 36-37. In addition, the Tribunal determined there was no "common knowledge in
Germany that would apprise any of the defendants of the existence of Hitler's plans or ulti-
mate purpose." Id. at 36. In the Krupp decision, Judge Anderson noted that the defendants
were not able to distinguish whether rearmament was for offensive or defensive purposes. The
mere fact they manufactured offensive weapons was not viewed as determinative since offen-
sive warfare and aggressive war "is not the same thing. Offensive weapons may be, and fre-
quently are, employed by a nation in conducting a justifiable war." The Krupp Trial, supra
note 329.
362. An extreme example of reluctance to imply knowledge involved the sale of Zyklon-
B gas used to exterminate those detained in concentration camps. A United States military
tribunal refused to imply knowledge to those who sold the gas to the German government:
But neither the volume of production, nor the fact that large quantities were
destined to concentration camps was in itself sufficient to impute criminal re-
sponsibility, as it was established by the evidence that there existed a great de-
mand for insecticides wherever large numbers of displaced persons, brought in
from widely scattered regions, were confined in congested quarters lacking ade-
quate sanitary facilities.
The I.G. Farben Trial, supra note 323, at 24.
363. The Zyklon B Case, I L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 93 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, Germany 1946).
364. Id. at 102.
365. Id. at 94.
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of disinfecting buildings, but was being used to kill human beings.366
It ruled that "any civilian who is an accessory to a violation of the
laws and customs of war is himself also liable as a war criminal."36
Once obtaining knowledge of illegal activities, a manufacturer
appears to have a duty to terminate their involvement in the illegal
activity. In the I.G. Farben case, the defendants were acquitted of
providing drugs and vaccines to doctors who were allegedly using the
drugs to conduct experiments on the typhus virus using the inmates
of concentration camps. 368 The Tribunal pointed out that Farben
"had stopped the forwarding of drugs to these physicians as soon as
their improper conduct was suspected." 3 9 Failure to take action to
terminate complicity in illegal activity may be excused, however, on
the grounds of necessity - a threat of imminent and severe physical
harm inflicted by officials of the Third Reich.370
Thus, post-Nuremberg military courts were reluctant to imply
knowledge of aggressive German war plans and war crimes to indus-
trialists involved in the production of armaments. However, where a
knowing and voluntary involvement by industrialists in the prepara-
tion for aggressive war was demonstrated, the tribunals were unwill-
ing to permit such individuals to avoid legal liability by "'putting on
the symbolic silk hat and claiming privileged status.' "371
D. Scientists and the Right To Peace
American scientists, unlike most of the German industrialists
prosecuted following World War II, are not merely manufacturing
weapons. Instead, they are designing, researching, testing and ,in
some cases, initiating a new generation of high-technology weapons
systems. Some of these weapons systems, such as SDI, are uniquely
appropriate to and designed as part of an aggressive nuclear first
strike.3 72 The end result will be the militarization of the common
heritage of outer space. Unlike the alleged secret Nazi military
plans, the illegal American nuclear first strike strategy is well-publi-
cized and well-known.373 Those American scientists involved in the
SDI program are thus voluntarily and knowingly providing the ille-
366. Id. at 101.
367. Id. at 103.
368. The I.G. Farben Trial, supra note 323, at 25.
369. Id.
370. The Flick Trial, supra note 318, at 20-21.
371. The Krupp Trial, supra note 329, at 172. The acquittal of various industrialists
appears ingenuous given the defendants' sophistication and involvement in the military prepa-
ration of the Third Reich. See The Flick Trial, supra note 318, at 17.
372. See supra notes 104-122 and accompanying text.
373. See generally Lippman, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Towards a Dec-
laration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986).
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gal instrumentalities which may be used in furtherance of a criminal
war of aggression.
Scientists, as previously indicated, have an internationally rec-
ognized moral responsibility to devote their talents to peaceful pur-
poses?374 a knowing breach of this duty, under post-World War II
precedents, may result in the imposition of international criminal lia-
bility.3 7 5 Under such circumstances, a scientist must know what he is
doing is "wrong and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it
would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished."3 As
Professor Weermantry commented, knowingly being "party to the
construction of weaponry without which a crime cannot be commit-
ted is equivalent to complicty in the crime. '1 77
The destructive potential of the extension of the arms race into
space and of a nuclear first strike are so devastating that an applica-
tion of the principles established in post-World War II war crimes
cases to contemporary scientists is required if civilization is to be
protected and preserved. Although the Nuremberg trials were for-
merly initiated by the Allied Powers, as in the case of the militariza-
tion of space, the "real complaining party at . . . bar is Civiliza-
tion." 37.8 Justice Jackson noted that the hope of those whose interests
are counter to the most noble aspirations of the peoples of the world
is that international law will "lag so far behind the moral sense of
mankind that conduct which is crime in the moral sense must be
regarded as innocent in law." 3
79
Justice Jackson made it clear that the principles which were be-
ing applied to the Germans at Nuremberg, would, in the future, bind
and be applied to the citizens and leaders of the Allied govern-
ments.38 0 The privilege of the peoples of the world to enforce these
principles and to halt the development of space weapons systems is
implicit in the 1978 Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for
Life in Peace which formally recognized the collective human right
to peace.311 The first operative paragraph of the 1978 Declaration
proclaims that every nation and human being has the "inherent right
374. See supra notes 233-77 and accompanying text.
375. See generally In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1946).
376. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 462.
377. G.C. WEERMANTRY, supra note 276, at 150.
378. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 314, at 155 (opening state-
ment of Justice Jackson).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 154. It should be noted that the Army manual of land warfare, inter alia,
punishes the inchoate offenses of conspiracy, direct incitement and complicity in the commis-
sion of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. See DEP'T OF THE
ARMY. FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 500 (1956), cited in Boyle,
Determining U.S. Responsibility for Contra Operations Under International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 86, 89 (1987).
381. G.A. Res. 33/73 (XXXIII) 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/
33/486 (1978).
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to peace." 382 The second paragraph reiterates the Nuremberg rule
that the planning, preparation or initiation of a war of aggression is
a crime against peace which is prohibited under international law.3 83
The 1984 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace 84 pro-
claims that life without war serves as the primary international pre-
requisite for the material well-being and development of countries
and for the provision of fundamental human rights. 385 In the nuclear
age, the preservation of peace is considered to be central to the pres-
ervation of human civilization. 386 The Preamble concludes that "the
maintenance of a peaceful life for peoples is the sacred duty of each
state. ' ' 387 Paragraph 1 proclaims that "the peoples of our planet have
a sacred right to peace.3 88 Paragraph 2 declares that each state has a
fundamental obligation to preserve and to promote "the right of peo-
ples to peace. '389 Paragraph 4 appeals to all states and international
organizations to assist in implementing the right to peace through
the adoption of appropriate measures at both the national and inter-
national levels. 390 These steps, as enumerated in paragraph 3, should
be directed towards the elimination of the threat of conventional and
nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international re-
lations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means.
391
Reviewing the activities of the United Nations, Professor Ved
Nanda concludes that the right to peace now has been established as
a fundamental, collective human right.3 92 States, in Nanda's view,
have the duty to refrain from the threat or use of armed force, are
obligated to resolve international disputes by peaceful means and
should strive to lessen domestic and international tensions through
the promotion of human rights and economic development.393 As a
corollary to the duty of states to promote peace, Nanda argues that
individuals have the right to participate in decision-making on issues
of war and peace, to promote peaceful governmental policies and "to
object to, challenge and oppose those policies an individual perceives
to be threatening or inviting the use of force. 39 4 Included in the
382. Id. section 1, para. 1.
383. Id. section 1, para. 2.
384. G.A. Res. 39/11 (XXXIX) 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 220, U.N. Doc. A/
39/L.14 (1984).
385. Id. at Preamble.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. para. 1.
389. Id. para. 2.
390. Id. para 4.
391. Id. para. 3.
392. Nanda, Nuclear Weapons And The Right To Peace Under International Law, 9
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 283, 289 (1983).
393. Id. at 293.
394. Id.
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latter, is the privilege of challenging and preventing the development
of SDI and space-based weapons.
VII. International Law and American Domestic Law
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdictions, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination." 8 " International law, according to the Supreme
Court, "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writ-
ings professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice
of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law." 96 Where there are no controlling executive or legislative acts
or judicial decisions, international law may be determined by the
"customs and usages of civilized nations." 9 ' A recognized custom
and usage must have the general assent of civilized nations in order
to insure that domestic courts will not "impose idiosyncratic legal
rules . ..in the name of applying international law." a39  In particu-
lar, the Supreme Court has recognized that American domestic
courts traditionally have applied the international law of war, includ-
ing that part which regulates the conduct of war and the rights and
duties of combatants and civilians. 3 99
Attempts to interpose claims based upon international law to
halt weapons development, testing or deployment or to challenge
United States foreign policy have been rejected by courts on the
grounds that the defendants lack standing or that their claim in-
volves a political question. In Pauling v. McElroy,"0 0 the plantiffs
sought an injunction prohibiting the detonation of any nuclear weap-
ons which might produce radiation or radioactive atomic nuclei, re-
quested a declaratory judgment that nuclear weapons tests are ille-
gal and sued for damages on behalf of those who sustained injuries
as a result of such tests. 0 1 The defendants were denied standing on
the grounds they did not
allege a specific threatened injury to themselves, apart from
395. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
396. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.(5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); Lopes v. Schroeder,
225 F. Supp. 292, 295(E.D. Pa. 1963).
397. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. See generally Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, article 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1031 T.S. no. 993, 1976 U.N.Y.B.
1052, U.N. Sales No. E.78.1.1 (entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945).
398. Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing the Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. at 694).
399. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 17, 27-28 (1942).
400. Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. App. 1960) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835
(1960).
401. Id. at 253.
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others, but rather set themselves up as protestants, on behalf of
all mankind, against the risks of nuclear contamination in com-
mon with people generally. Standing to sue, even as to the citi-
zen of the United States, does not arise out of such general and
indefinite allegations of injury.402
In United States v. May, 03 the defendants were denied stand-
ing to raise the legality of the Trident Missile on the grounds that
they were unable to demonstrate any direct injury to themselves. 0 4
The Court explained that the judiciary did not
sit to render judgements upon the legality of the conduct of the
government at the request of any person who asks us to because
he happens to think that what the government is doing is wrong.
He must be able to show some direct harm to himself, not a
theoretical future harm to all of us that may or may not
occur.
40 5
In other cases, federal courts have ruled that the political ques-
tion doctrine prevents the judiciary from inquiring into the legality
under international law of foreign policy and defense matters. 0 In
United States v. Berrigan,107 the District Court observed that the
recognition of a belligerency abroad and the measures necessary to
protect national security are "uniquely an executive and legislative
responsibility.'40 8 The Court went on to note that:
Whether the actions by the executive and the legislative
branches in utilizing our armed forces are in accord with inter-
national law is a question which necessarily must be left to the
elected representatives of the people and not to the judiciary.
This is so even if the government's actions are contrary to the
valid treaties to which the government is a signatory. 0 9
In the words of then Circuit Court Judge Warren E. Burger,
judges are not "Guardian Elders ordained to review the political
judgments of elected representatives of the people."' 1  Burger went
402. Id. at 254. Defendants who have challenged policies on the, grounds of Nuremberg
have had their claims rejected on the grounds that they themselves have not been ordered or
required to engage in war crines. See generally United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336,
341 (D. Md. 1968), affd sub nom United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied 397 U.S. 909 (1970). See also United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 590 (8th
Cir. 1986).
403. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
404. Id. at 1009.
405. Id.
406. See Davi v. Laird, 318- F. Supp. 478, 484 (W.D. Va. 1970).
407. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968).
408. Id. at 342.
409. Id. The court also noted that "Congress may constitutionally override treaties by
later enactment of an inconsistent statute, even though the subsequent statute is in violation of
international law." Id.
410. Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
[Vol. 9:2
SDI: SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY
on to observe that judges are
neither gods nor godlike, but judicial officers with narrow and
limited authority. Our entire System of Government would suf-
fer incalculable mischief should judges attempt to interpose the
judicial will above that of the Congress and President, even were
we so bold as to assume that we can make better decisions on
such issues.""'
Frustrated by their inability to obtain judicial review of their
international law claims, various individuals have claimed the right
under international law to engage in criminal acts of civil resistance
in an attempt to conform domestic law to international law. Courts
have rejected such arguments and have concluded that the blocking
of streets or sidewalks "under the aegis of international law would
foment an anarchical result. '412 Courts have found no precedent for
the proposition that
a free and democratic society must excuse violation of its laws
by those seeking to conform their country's policies to interna-
tional law. Compliance with international law must be sought
through the ballot box, or, where appropriate by joint action.
Illegal conduct designed to influence policies cannot be consid-
ered "necessary" where such lawful avenues are available.413
Thus, courts have relied upon the standing and political ques-
tion doctrines to avoid the litigation of international law challenges
to United States' foreign and defense policies. They also have denied
individuals standing in criminal cases
to mount a similar attack through the back door, by using it as a
defense to a charge that they deliberately brought on them-
selves, one that bears no genuine relationship to the government
program that they seek to attack. The approach is different, but
the result must be the same.""
One available remedy to compel United States courts to enforce
international law and to take a step towards halting SDI and the
militarization of space is for people to invoke the privilege of citi-
zen's arrest and to bring those scientists involved in such research
before the bar of justice.
933 (1964).
411. Id.
412. People v. Weber, 162 Cal.App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722 (1984).
413. In Re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1985). See also
United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
414. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1980).
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VIII. Citizen's Arrest and the.Violation of International Law
Prior to the formation of formal police organizations, the pri-
mary burden of law enforcement was vested in the citizenry. During
the first four to five hundred years of the development of the com-
mon law, private persons and local sheriffs and constables possessed
equal powers of arrest." 5
England's Ordinance of 1195 commanded all men to arrest out-
laws, robbers, thieves and those who assisted such criminals; 416 and
in 1233 a system of night watchmen was established in which the
watchmen were directed to arrest those armed individuals who en-
tered the village at night. 4'7 The Statute of Winchester of 1285 was
the "great legislative landmark' 418 which embodied existing rules
and practices.419 In addition to requiring the appointment of a speci-
fied number of night watchmen for every city and borough,420 the
Statute formally established a system of local citizen-based law en-
forcement. 42 The so-called "hue and cry" required all men between
fifteen and sixty to respond to an alarm by seizing their weapons and
aiding in the pursuit of an offender.422 Whenever a crime was com-
mitted, local inhabitants were responsible for apprehending robbers
and felons within forty days; a failure to do so resulted in the imposi-
tion of liability upon the village inhabitants.4 23 A fourth mechanism,
possecomitatus, empowered local law enforcement officials to call
upon ordinary citizens to assist in the arrest of suspected
wrongdoers. 424
Thus, "until quite modern times police duties were the duty of
every man''425 and law and order depended upon "a web of related,
interlocking activities and organizations, that ,enlisted the service of
a great majority of the men in the realm .... -426 In 1829, a formal
system of professional police was introduced in England427 in order
to better provide for law and order in the new urban and industrial
environments. 4 " The arrest powers of the newly formed police or
415. Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 517, 413 A.2d 1340, 1347 (1980).
416. Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 547 (1924).
417. Id.
418. Hall, Legal And Social Aspects Of Arrest Without A Warrant, 49 HARVARD L.
REV. 566, 579 (1936).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 580.
422. Warner, Investigating The Law Of Arrest, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY & PO-
LICE SCI. I1I, 112 (1940). See also Hall, supra note 393, at 580.
423. Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 517 n.6, 413 A.2d 1340, 1347 n.6 (1980).
424. Warner, supra note 422, at 112.
425. Hall, supra note 418, at 579.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 583.
428. Id. at 585.
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"bobbies" generally were identical with those which continued to be
vested in ordinary citizens.'"
The common law right of citizen arrest was transported to the
United States.'30 Section 22 of the American Law Institute's Model
Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the prevailing rule for arrests
by private persons.' A private person may make an arrest:
(a) When the person to be arrested has in his presence com-
mitted a misdemeanor, amounting to a breach of the peace, or a
felony.
(b) When a felony has been in fact committed and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it.'32
According to this formulation, a private individual may arrest
an individual who commits, in their presence, a misdemeanor, which
constitutes a breach of the peace, or a felony. "'33 Individuals also are
privileged to conduct a warrantless arrest of an individual who is
suspected of having committed a felony, not in their presence, when:
a felony, in fact, has been committed and there are reasonable
grounds to believe the person has actually committed the felony.' 3 '
Section 26 states that the private individual making the arrest
shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention and grounds of
the arrest. 3 5 Such information need not be provided if the offender
is engaged in the commission of an offense; or is being pursued im-
mediately following the commission of the offense. 36 The private cit-
izen also need not inform the offender of the arrest if the offender
flees or forcibly resists before the private citizen has had the oppor-
tunity to inform them of the arrest. 3
Following an arrest, an individual only may be detained for a
429. Warner supra note 422, at 112. A police officer was justified in arresting an indi-
vidual upon a reasonable belief that a felony had been committed. A private individual was
entitled to arrest an individual if there was a reasonable belief that a crime had been commit-
ted and the individual, in fact, had committed the felony. Id. at 112, n.4.
430. See generally M.C. BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN'S ARREST THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE (1977).
431. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE sec. 22 (Official Draft 1930) [hereinafter CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
432. Id.
433. Id. sec. 22 commentary, at 238.
434. Id. at 239-40.
435. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 430, sec. 26.
A private person when making an arrest shall inform the person to be ar-
rested of the intention to arrest him and the cause of the arrest, unless he is then
engaged in the commission of an offense, or is pursued immediately after its
commission or after an escape, or flees or forcibly resists before the person mak-
ing the arrest has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest.
Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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reasonable period and in a reasonable manner prior to their being
turned over to the authorities. 38 Likewise, the permissible amount of
force is adjudged on a reasonableness standard;" 9 and the offender
has a duty to cooperate and not to resist the arrest.4 "
In Stevenson v. State,'41 the Maryland Court of Appeals re-
jected the contention that in modern times the judicial approval and
the utilization of citizen's arrest would lead to social disruption and
chaos." 2 The Court pointed out that most people would not choose
to exercise the right of citizen's arrest and that citizens exercising
this right would not exercise it in an arbitrary fashion since they
would be required to justify the arrest before a judicial forum."13
Most importantly, the court concluded that "placing greater obsta-
cles in the path of citizens who wish to aid society may, in the end,
prove to be detrimental to the maintenance of peace and good order
in the community.""' As observed in Brooks v. Commonwealth:"85
It is also said that arrrest by a private person is contrary to
the genius of our institutions, and is the relic of a barbarous age.
But the reverse is the case in a republic, where the people them-
selves represent its security. The felon is an enemy to the sover-
eignty and security, forfeits his liberty, and cannot complain
that the hand of his fellowman arrests his flight and returns him
to justice. What title has he to immunity from the law which he
has violated, and to be permitted to escape its penalties because
the officer of justice is not at hand to seize him? He has broken
the bond of society; he has dealt a blow at its welfare and secur-
ity, and he has placed himself in open hostitlity to all its faithful
members, whose duty it becomes to bring him to justice." 6
The power of citizen's arrest developed due to the lack of organ-
ized state law enforcement authorities and as a reflection of the phil-
osophical belief that local communities should participate in the po-
licing and defining of the security needs of their own communities .41
In the international arena, there is a similar lack of law enforcement
authority and a new realization that individuals must act in a mor-
ally responsible fashion in order to preserve the habitability of the
438. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 429, at 49-50.
439. Id. at 50-51.
440. Id. at 56-57. For a discussion of civil liability for a "false" citizen's arrest see id. at
60-64.
441. Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980).
442. 287 Md. at 520, 413 A.2d at 1349.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 359 (1869) quoted in 287 Md. at 520-21,
413 A.2d at 1349.
446. Id.
447. See generally supra notes 416, 393, 397.
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planet."4 8 As with domestic offenses, when international crimes pose
a threat to individual safety, the community is legally empowered to
protect itself. Where the threat is to collective safety and is spon-
sored by governmental authorities, the imperative to act is even
greater than in the case of the isolated "common criminal."
Individual citizens arguably have a compelling responsibility to
arrest scientists engaged in SDI and other space-based weapons re-
search. Such scientists are knowingly and voluntarily developing
weapons systems which are prohibited by the Outer Space4 9 and
ABM Treaties450 which are intended to be used as part of an illegal
nuclear first strike in violation of the United Nations Charter. 5'
Scientists not only have an international moral responsibility to
devote themselves to peaceful pursuits, 5 but are guilty of waging an
aggressive war under the principles established in post-World War II
war crimes trials. 53 The citizen's arrest is a mechanism which may
force the judiciary to enforce, rather than continuing to evade, their
responsibility to enforce international law principles and to ensure
the collective right to peace.' 5 '
The State will find itself in the position of prosecuting either the
scientist who is arrested or those who conducted the allegedly "false
arrest." In either case, international law is central and cannot be
easily dismissed as irrelevant to the adjudication of the case. It is
determinative both on the question of the reasonableness of the ar-
rest and as to whether an international crime has been committed. 55
By placing the morality and legality of scientific conduct and
space weaponry on trial, the mechanism of citizen's arrest permits a
judicial "town meeting" to be conducted on theses issues. In this
sense, the citizen's arrest is a device to expand democratic discussion
and decison-making. If governmental authorities refuse to act, the
trial should be conducted by a citizens' tribunal. Scientists who are
convicted should be requested to devote their energies to peaceful
humane projects. Two critics argue for open debate of political issues
in the courtroom
so that deep matters of justice are not settled on shallow
448. See generally, Aldridge & Stark, Citizen Intervention and the Necessity Defense,
26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1986).
449. See generally supra notes 136-78 and accompanying text.
450. See generally supra notes 179-215 and accompanying text.
451. See generally supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text.
452. See generally supra notes 216-54 and accompanying text.
453. See generally supra notes 255-369 and accompanying text.
454. See generally supra notes 370-89 and accompanying text.
455. A citizen's arrest does nothave to be based upon direct personal knowledge. See
United States v. Gowen, 40 F. 593, 596 (2d Cir. 1930). State statutes authorizing citizen's
arrests permit arrests for federal offenses. See United States v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, 47-49(2d Cir. 1977). For a summary of relevant state citizen's arrest statutes see BASSIOUNI, supra
note 429, at 87-95 (Appendix A).
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grounds of technical law (concealing substantive prejudice), and
so that human values, beyond simple acceptance of authority,
can begin to determine the decisions of judges and juries. In this
way, the developing political education of the American people
can begin to be reflected in the courtroom. If democracy involves
a truly free marketplace of ideas, then it should allow a move-
ment of our country towards that democracy promised in the
Declaration of Independence and struggled for over the centu-
ries by a generation of citizens.4 6
IX. Some Conclusing Observations
This essay has argued that SDI is an illegal weapons system
which is a harbinger of a new generation of high technology space
weapons which threaten to transform the still relatively pristine envi-
ronment of outer space into a militarized zone of superpower
competition.
Scientists, according to various international documents, have a
moral responsibility and duty to utilize their skills for peaceful,
rather than for militaristic purposes. Scientific involvement in the
first strike SDI program also may result in international liability
under the principles established at Nuremberg and the associated
post-World War II war crimes trials. Domestic courts generally have
been unreceptive to appeals to international law, creating a situation
in which individuals arguably are justified and compelled to resort to
the common law mechanism of citizen's arrest in an attempt to halt
the development of SDI and other space-based weapons systems. In-
dividuals conducting such arrests would be acting as representatives
of the global community who desire to create a safe, ecologically
pristine planetary environment.
Although this appears to be advocacy of a utopian and quixotic,
if not absurd, course of action, therapist R.D. Laing in his classic
volume The Politics Of Experience,"'57 reminds us that the psycho-
logically perfectly adjusted bomber pilot poses a greater threat to the
survival of the species than does the allegedly maladjusted and hos-
pitalized schizophrenic. 458 Laing notes that so-called normal men
have been responsible for the death of perhaps 100,000,000 of their
fellow human beings in the twentieth century.' 59 It must then be
queried which is more threatening - the advocacy of the citizen's
arrest of scientists involved in space-weapons research or the vision
456. Zin & Stewart, Ideology in the Courtroom, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 724 (1985-
86).
457. R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967).
458. Id. at 120.
459. Id. at 28.
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of those who design and develop such weaponry and who ultimately
may destroy our planet. As Professor Francis Boyle observes, no civi-
lized state would permit a gang of criminal conspirators to pervert
its domestic legal order in the same fashion in which a small group
of nation-states have been permitted to aggressively dominate and
threaten the integrity of the international legal system and the fu-
ture of the globe. 60
This advocacy of citizen's arrest to enforce international norms
of behavior is part of what Arthur Kaufman, in an essay translated
from German, has termed "a right to resist on a small scale.' 61
Kaufman argues that the right to resist, rather than being viewed as
an often futile, and violent act directed against tyrannical authority,
should be perceived as a limited, non-violent act designed to combat
deviations from democratic norms.' 62 This "'petty' ",463 resistance, in
Kaufman's view, will help make "'grand' ",464 resistance unneces-
sary. Advocacy of petty resistance is a recognition that, as historian
turned lawyer Staughton Lynd writes, in the nuclear age, "nation-
states are chronic criminals far more dangerous than the solitary
practitioner of nonviolent civil disobedience."'16 Lynd goes on to con-
tend that it is the resister who hopefully will be the catalyst who is
able "to recall authority to common sense. "466
In 1970, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas com-
plained in his book, Points Of Rebellion,467 that the "pressures of
the military-industrial complex seem always to suffocate the pleas of
those who want to be done with war and create a cooperative world
pattern for the solution of international problems."'6 8 Justice Doug-
las went on to raise the question whether the pursuit of justice would
continue to be subordinated to what government leaders considered
to be more pragmatic concerns. 69 He concluded, in language which
still rings true, that "today's Establishment is the new George III.
Whether it will continue to adhere to his tactics, we do not know. If
it does, the redress, honored in tradition, is also revolution."' 70
460. Boyle, Citizen Initiatives Under International Law: The Criminality of Nuclear
Weapons, 8 SCANDANAVIAN J. DEV. ALTERNATIVES 37, 40 (1989).
461. Kaufman, Small Scale Right to Resist, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 571, 576 (1985-86).
462. Id. at 574-76.
463. Id. at 576.
464. Id.
465. Lynd, Civil Disobedience In Wartime, 19 ME. L. REV. 49, 54 (1967).
466. Id.
467. W.O. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1970).
468. Id. at 65.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 95.
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